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DOE v. COUNTY OF CENTRE: FOSTER CHILDREN,
AIDS, THE AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT,
AND THE DIRECT THREAT EXCEPTION
INTRODUCTION
The Americans with Disabilities Act of 19901 (ADA) was designed
to promote a clear federal mandate that discrimination on the basis of
one's disability in the areas of employment, public accommodations,
and public services was intolerable. 2 Like most statutes, the ADA has
exceptions, or permissible times where disability discrimination will be
tolerated. One such exception arises where an "individual poses a di-
rect threat to the health or safety of others."'3 This exception was ad-
ded to the ADA, as well as to its precursor, the Rehabilitation Act of
1973 (Rehabilitation Act), 4 in order to recognize that, specifically
within the context of contagious diseases, others must be protected
from "significant . . . safety risks" that contagious individuals may
pose.5 This exception arose just as the Acquired Immune Deficiency
Syndrome (AIDS) epidemic was sweeping the nation.6 Thus, many
defendants in discrimination cases have attempted to use this excep-
tion to justify their disparate treatment of an individual with the
human immunodeficiency virus (HIV) or AIDS. 7 Although there are
legitimate situations where an HIV-positive individual may pose a "di-
1. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (1995 & Supp. 2002).
2. H.R. REP. No. 101-485, pt. 2, at 28 (1990).
3. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(3) (1995). See also 42 U.S.C. § 12111(3) (1995): 42 U.S.C. § 12111(3)
(2001): 28 C.F.R. pt. 35. app. A. at 483 (2001). cited in Doe v. County of Ctr.. 242 F.3d 437, 447
(3d Cir. 2001).
4. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 705. 794 (1999).
5. Bragdon v. Abbott. 524 U.S. 624, 649 (1998) (interpreting Sch. Bd. of Nassau County v.
Arline, 480 U.S. 273. 287 (1987)).
6. See Arline. 480 U.S. at 282 n.7. In this case, the Supreme Court established a four-factor
test to determine the existence of a significant risk under the Rehabilitation Act--(a) the na-
ture of the risk .... (b) the duration of the risk .... (c) the severity of the risk .... and (d) the
probabilities the disease will be transmitted .. (.1." Id. at 288. However. the Court specifically
left open the question whether HIV/AIDS was a "handicap" under the Rehabilitation Act. Id.
at 282 n.7.
7. See, e.g., Doe v. County of Ctr., 242 F.3d 437 (3d Cir. 2001): Abbott v. Bragdon. 163 F.3d 87
(1st Cir. 1998): Estate of Mauro v. Borgess Med. Ctr.. 137 F.3d 398 (6th Cir. 1998), cert. denied.
525 U.S. 815 (1998): Doe v. Univ. of Md. Med. Sys. Corp., 50 F.3d 1261 (4th Cir. 1995): Bradley
v. Univ. of Tex. M.D. Anderson Cancer Ctr., 3 F.3d 922 (5th Cir. 1993), cert. denied. 510 U.S.
1119 (1994): Martinez v. Sch. Bd.. 861 F.2d 1502 (11th Cir. 1988): Chalk v. United States Dist.
Court, 840 F.2d 701 (9th Cir. 1988). See infra notes 144-298 and accompanying text. See gener-
ally Steven H. Aden, Esq., HIV/AIDS and the Public Accommodations Provisions of the Ameri-
cans with Disabilities Act, 9 TEMP. POL. & Civ. RTs. L. REV. 395 (2000).
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rect threat" to the health and safety of others, courts must be careful
not to let this exception overcome the purpose of the ADA.
This Note will discuss the direct threat exception as it has been ap-
plied to HIV/AIDS discrimination cases. Part II will discuss the back-
ground and history of the AIDS epidemic and the ADA, including the
Rehabilitation Act, leading up to a recent application of the direct
threat exception in Doe v. County of Centre.8 Part III will explain the
Third Circuit's rationale in deciding County of Centre.9 Part IV will
critique the Third Circuit's application of the direct threat exception
in that case as well as discuss what should result on remand. 10 Part V
will analyze how this case may affect future judicial application of the
direct threat exception."
II. BACKGROUND
In order to understand current application of the direct threat ex-
ception as it applies to HIV/AIDS cases, a brief history of the disease
will be discussed. This section will also address the legislative re-
sponse to persons with disabilities and how persons with contagious
diseases such as HIV/AIDS have been protected under disability laws.
How the direct threat exception came into existence and how its appli-
cation has affected those afforded protection under the ADA and Re-
habilitation Act will also be discussed.
A. The History of HIV and AIDS
The early 1980s marked the beginning of a new tragic and deadly
disease.12 In June of 1981, the Centers for Disease Control and Pre-
vention (CDC) received numerous reports of gay men suffering
unique diseases as a result of severely depressed immune systems.13
8. 242 F.3d 437 (3d Cir. 2001). See infra notes 12-183 and accompanying text.
9. See infra notes 184-248 and accompanying text.
10. See infra notes 249-343 and accompanying text.
11. See infra notes 344-364 and accompanying text.
12. See generally RANDY SHILTS. AND THE BAND PLAYED ON: POLITICS, PEOPLE AND THE
AIDS EPIDEMIC (1987). The current worldwide rates of HIV and AIDS infection are particu-
larly staggering. The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention estimates that as of the end of
the year 2000 there were 36.1 million people living with HIV or AIDS. See http://www.cdc.gov/
hiv/stats/international.html (last updated Jan. 2. 2001) (on file with DePaul Law Review). Six-
teen point four million are estimated to be women. Id. One point four million are children
under the age of fifteen. Id. It is estimated by the Centers for Disease Control that 21.8 million
people have died from AIDS since the beginning of the epidemic. Id. Four point three million
of these deaths are estimated to be children. See http://www.un.org/ga/aids/bulletin-l.htm (last
updated Nov. 2000) (on file with DePaul Law Review),
13. THEODORE J. STEIN. THE SOCIAL WELFARE OF WOMEN AND CHILDREN WIH HIV AND
AIDS, LEGAL PROTECTIONS. POLICY AND PROGRAMS I (Duncan Lindsey ed.. 1998). See also
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In July of 1981, the CDC reported over twenty cases of young gay
men contracting Kaposi's sarcoma (KS), a cancer that is rarely found
in otherwise healthy individuals.14 Other gay men were diagnosed
with rare forms of pneumonia, including Pneumocystis carinii pneu-
monia (PCP).' 5 By August, the CDC received reports of over one
hundred cases of these unique conditions.1 6 These reports included
ninety-five homosexual men, six heterosexual men, five men of un-
known sexual orientation, and one woman. 17 Within the next year,
this still unknown disease began showing up in children and recipients
of blood transfusions. 18 A national panic ensued.19
As reports of these rare diseases made their way from gay men to
mainstream populations, fears escalated.20 Because people were una-
ware of how the disease was transmitted, unreasonable fears soon
abounded.21
The CDC first named this condition "acquired immune deficiency
syndrome" and started using the now infamous acronym "AIDS" in a
September 1982 edition of Morbidity and Mortality Weekly. 22 Now
DARRELL E. WARD, THE AMFAR AIDS HANDBOOK: THE COMPLETE GUIDE TO UNDER-
STANDING HIV AND AIDS 366 (1999).
14. WARD, supra note 13, at 367.
15. Id. at 366. This, combined with other conditions, soon became known as "gay cancer." Id.
at 367.
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. Id. at 370, 374.
19. See generally SHILTS. supra note 12.
20. See WARD, supra note 13. at 376-77. Some police officers in California demanded that
they be given "special masks and gloves" for when they came into contact with so-called "poten-
tially dangerous citizens." Id. at 376.
21. Id. It is now known that the three main modes of transmission of the HIV virus are
through: (1) unprotected sexual contact: (2) the sharing of needles (usually used to inject intra-
venous drugs); and (3) mother to child transmission. HIV and Its Transmission, at http://
www.cdc.gov/hiv/pubs/facts/transmission.htm (last updated Jan. 31. 2001) (on file with DePaul
Law Review). The mother to child transmission can occur in one of the following ways: (a)
through in utero exposure (b) through transmission during birth or (c) through breast-feeding.
id.
22. See WARD, supra note 13, at 374. The CDC found that 593 cases of AIDS were reported
to the CDC from June 1, 1981 through September 15, 1982. Current Trends Update on Acquired
Immune Deficiency Syndrome (AIDS)-United States, MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WKLY.. Sept.
24. 1982, available at http://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/preview/mmwrhtml/00001163.htm (last reviewed
May 2, 2001) (on file with DePaul Law Review). In an editorial note, the CDC defined AIDS:
as a disease, at least moderately predictive of a defect in cell-mediated immunity. oc-
curring in a person with no known cause for diminished resistance to that disease. Such
diseases include KS, PCP .... However, this case definition may not include the full
spectrum of AIDS manifestations, which may range from absence of symptoms ... to
non-specific symptoms (e.g., fever, weight loss, generalized, persistent lymphade-
nopathy) to specific diseases that are insufficiently predictive of cellular immu-
nodeficiency to be included in incidence monitoring (e.g.. tuberculosis, oral candidiasis,
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knowing what to call this mysterious condition, the CDC published
general guidelines that were believed to prevent transmission by
1983.23 By the end of that year, the culprit of the disease was identi-
fied as a human retrovirus. 24  This retrovirus was given the name
"human immunodeficiency virus," or "HIV. ''25 Isolating and identify-
herpes zoster) to malignant neoplasms that cause, as well as result from, immu-
nodeficiency. Conversely, some patients who are considered AIDS cases on the basis
of diseases only moderately predictive of cellular immunodeficiency may not actually
be immunodeficient and may not be part of the current epidemic. Absence of a relia-
ble. inexpensive, widely available test for AIDS, however. may make the working case
definition the best currently available for incidence monitoring.
Id. In 1991, the CDC revised its case definition for AIDS. 1993 Revised Classification System
for HIV Infection and Expanded Surveillance Case Definition for AIDS Among Adolescents and
Adults, MORBIDITY AND MORAL1TY WKLY., Dec. 18, 1992, available at http://www.cdc.gov/
mmwr/preview/mmwrhtml/00018871 (last updated July 25, 2001) (on file with DePaul Law Re-
view). This new definition "include[s] all HIV-infected persons with CD4+ T-lymphocyte counts
of less than 200 cells/uL or a CD4+ percentage of less than 14." Id. This definition also includes
23 clinical conditions. Id.
23. See WARD, supra note 13, at 376. These guidelines recommended that persons: (1) avoid
having sex with persons believed to be infected with the disease (2) reduce the number of peo-
ple with whom they have sexual contact and (3) recommended that persons considered mem-
bers of "high risk" groups (which in 1983 predominately meant gay men) avoid donating blood.
Id. As of June 2000, the highest risk activities for HIV or AIDS reported to the Centers for
Disease Control in the United States are: (1) men who have sex with men with 348,657 reported
cases; (2) injection drug users with 189.242 reported cases; (3) persons exposed through hetero-
sexual contact with 78,210 reported cases: (4) men who have sex with men and inject drugs with
47,820 reported cases: (5) recipients of blood transfusions or tissues with 8666 reported cases:
and (6) hemophiliacs or others with blood disorders with 5121 reported cases. Basic Statistics:
Exposure Categories, at http://www/cdc.gov/hiv/stats/exposure.htm (added on Dec. 6, 2000) (on
file with DePaul Law Review). The mode of transmission was not identified in 67,387 cases
reported to the Centers for Disease Control. Id.
24. See WARD, supra note 13, at 377-78 (noting the controversy over who should get credit for
discovery of the retrovirus. Dr. Luc Montagnier of the Pasteur Institute (France) or Dr. Robert
Gallo of the National Institutes of Health (United States)). A retrovirus may be distinguished
from a regular virus in that a retrovirus produces DNA (deoxyribonucleic acid) from RNA
(ribonucleic acid), whereas a regular virus produces RNA from DNA. Id. at 299. See also
SHILTS. supra note 12: Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S. 624, 633-37 (1998). Justice Anthony Ken-
nedy's majority opinion in Bragdon explained:
The initial stage of HIV infection is known as acute or primary HIV infection. In a
typical case, this stage lasts three months. The virus concentrates in the blood. The
assault on the immune system is immediate. The victim suffers from a sudden and
serious decline in the number of white blood cells. There is no latency period.
Mononucleosis-like symptoms often emerge between six days and six weeks after infec-
tion, at times accompanied by fever, headache, enlargement of the lymph nodes. ...
muscle pain. . . . rash, lethargy. gastrointestinal disorders, and neurological disorders.
Usually these symptoms abate within 14 to 21 days. HIV antibodies appear in the
bloodstream within 3 weeks .... A person is regarded as having AIDS when his or her
CD4+ [white blood cell] count drops below 200 cells/mm3 of blood or when CD4+ cells
comprise less than 14% of his or her total lymphocytes ....
Bragdon, 524 U.S. at 635-36 (citations omitted).
25. SHILTS, supra note 12.
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ing this virus was a phenomenal step, as this meant that people could
now be tested for the virus before any symptoms materialized. 26
Recently, HIV treatments have become increasingly advanced. 27
The first HIV treatment drug, Azidothymidine (AZT), a nucleoside
analog drug, was developed in 1987.28 Although successful at first,
AZT soon lost its effectiveness as HIV became resistant to the drug.29
A second and third type of HIV treatment drug, nonnucleoside re-
verse transcriptase inhibitors and protease inhibitors, soon followed. 30
In recent years, all three types of these drugs have been combined to
form a "cocktail. ' '31 This combination therapy is called highly active
antiretroviral therapy (HAART). 32 As HAART has become more
popular, AIDS related deaths have been drastically reduced. 33
B. The Americans with Disabilities Act:
Background and Application
Before the ADA was enacted in the early 1990s, the Rehabilitation
Act was the major federal legislation protecting the rights of the dis-
abled.34 Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act 35 has the closest simi-
larities to the ADA.36 Although section 504 provides protections
from disability discrimination to those participating in programs re-
ceiving federal funds, more protections were needed for individuals
with disabilities in the public sector. 37 This section will detail section
26. See WARD, supra note 13. at 379.
27. See JOHN G. BARTLE-1, M.D. & ANN K. FINKIBEINER. THE GUIDE TO LIVING WITH HIV
INFECTION (1991), available at http://www.thebody.com/jh/bartlett/drugs.html (last visited Sept.
5, 2002) (on file with DePaul Law Review).
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. Id. All three drugs attack the same enzyme, reverse transcriptase. Id. It is this enzyme
the HIV virus uses to replicate itself. BARTLETFr & FINKEINER. supra note 27.
32. Id. Though effective in combating HIV. HAART has its own drawbacks. See id.
HAART must be taken in a very structured manner and can involve taking up to twenty-five
different pills a day. Id. The costs of these drugs are also astronomical. ranging from $50 to $160
per week. Id.
33. Id. (noting that AIDS-related complications dropped sixty to eighty percent over the first
two years after HAART was introduced).
34. See David M. Studdert & Troyen A. Brennan. The Americans with Disabilities Act: Social
Contract or Special Privilege?: HIV Infection and the Americans with Disabilities Act: An Evolv-
ing Interaction. 549 ANNALS 84. 87 (1997) (explaining how it was the intention of the Americans
with Disabilities Act to incorporate "existing provisions of the Rehabilitation Act").
35. 29 U.S.C. § 794 (1994).
36. See Mark C. Weber. Disability Discrimination by State and Local Government: The Rela-
tionship Between Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act and Title II of the Americans with Disabili-
ties Act, 36 Wi. & MARY L. REV. 1089. 1093-1117 (1995) (noting the similarities and differences
between section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act and Title It of the ADA).
37. Id. at 1089-90.
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504 of the Rehabilitation Act, the birth of the so-called "direct threat
exception," and the effects of both on the ADA.
1. Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973
The Rehabilitation Act of 197338 is often described as the precursor
to the ADA.39 Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act was passed with
the intention of prohibiting any program or entity receiving federal
funding from discriminating against persons on the basis of a disabil-
ity.40 Section 504 was not only intended to proscribe disability dis-
crimination in the employment context, but also offered protection
against disability discrimination in programs and services offered by
the federal government or run by any recipient of federal funding.
41
The Supreme Court noted in School Board of Nassau County v. Ar-
line42 that the purpose of enacting section 504 was to protect individu-
als with disabilities from discrimination based on "the prejudiced
attitudes or the ignorance of others. 43
For the purpose of this analysis, the Rehabilitation Act defines an
"individual with a disability" 44 as someone who: "(i) has a physical or
mental impairment which substantially limits one or more of such per-
son's major life activities; (ii) has a record of such impairment; or (iii)
is regarded as having such an impairment. ' 45 This definition was in-
tended to protect persons with disabilities from discrimination stem-
ming from prejudice as well as archaic assumptions as to the
capabilities of persons with disabilities. 46
To determine if one is eligible for protection under the Rehabilita-
tion Act, two prongs must be established.47 First, it must be decided if
38. See 29 U.S.C. § 794 (1994).
39. Studdert & Brennan. supra note 34. at 87.
40. Section 504 provides: "No otherwise qualified individual with a disability in the United
States ... shall, solely by reason of her or his disability, be excluded from the participation in. be
denied the benefits of. or be subjected to discrimination under any program or activity receiving
Federal financial assistances . . . . 29 U.S.C. § 794(a) (1994).
41. See H.R. REP. No. 101-485. pt. 3. at 24 (1990). cited in Doe v. County of Ctr., 242 F.3d 437.
447 (3d Cir. 2001).
42. 480 U.S. 273 (1987). See infra notes 64-66 and accompanying text.
43. Arline, 480 U.S. at 284.
44. 29 U.S.C. § 705(20) (1994). Until a recent amendment, the Rehabilitation Act read "No
otherwise qualified handicapped individual in the United States ... shall, solely by reason of his
handicap, be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to dis-
crimination under any program receiving Federal financial assistance." See Arline. 480 U.S. at
279 (emphasis added).
45. 29 U.S.C. § 705(20)(B) (1994).
46. S. REP. No. 93-1297. at 50 (1974). quoted in Arline. 480 U.S. at 279.
47. See generally Arline. 480 U.S. at 280-88.
[Vol. 52:945
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the individual is a person with a disability.48 To determine if this
prong is met, it must be established that the individual meets one of
the Rehabilitation Act's definitions of "an individual with a disabil-
ity."' 49 Second, it must be decided if the individual is "otherwise quali-
fied" for the employment opportunity, service, or program she was
denied. 50
2. Arline, Section 504, and Contagious Diseases: The Birth of the
Direct Threat Exception
In School Board of Nassau County v. Arline,5 the United States
Supreme Court considered whether a person suffering from the conta-
gious disease tuberculosis was an individual with a disability for pur-
poses of section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act.52 Arline, an
elementary school teacher, was discharged from her job after suffering
a recurrence of tuberculosis. 53 Arline argued her termination by the
school board was solely based on her tuberculosis, and that tuberculo-
sis qualified her as disabled.54 Thus, she argued her termination was a
violation of section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act.55
The defendant School Board argued that although the Rehabilita-
tion Act may apply to persons with contagious diseases, tuberculosis
should not be considered a disability because of the threat this conta-
gious condition "posed to the health of others. '5 6 Although the dis-
trict court found that Arline suffered from a disability, it found she did
not qualify for protection under the Rehabilitation Act.57 The district
court did not believe that it was Congress's intention that the defini-
tion of individuals with disabilities includes persons with contagious
diseases.58 The Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reversed,
48. Id. at 280.
49. See supra notes 44-45 and accompanying text.
50. Arline. 480 U.S. at 287. See also 29 U.S.C. § 794(a) (1994).
51. 480 U.S. 273 (1987). The majority opinion was written by Justice William Brennan and
joined by Justices Byron White. Thurgood Marshall. Harry Blackmun, Lewis Powell, and Sandra
Day O'Connor. Id. Chief Justice William Rehnquist and Justice Antonin Scalia dissented. Id. at
289.
52. Id. at 275.
53. id. at 276 (noting that after Arline suffered her third recurrence of the disease she was
suspended, with pay, from finishing the remainder of the school term).
54. Id.
55. Arline, 480 U.S. at 276.
56. Id. at 281.
57. Id. at 277. Chief Justice Rehnquist agreed with this finding of the district court. Id. at 291-
92 (Rehnquist. C.J.. dissenting). Chief Justice Rehnquist believed, by looking to the legislative
history of the Rehabilitation Act, "that contagiousness is not a handicap within the meaning of
[section] 504." Id. at 292 (Rehnquist. C.J.. dissenting).
58. Id. at 277.
2003]
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finding that persons with contagious diseases were eligible for protec-
tion under section 504.59 However, the Eleventh Circuit remanded
the case to see if Arline was "otherwise qualified" to teach children in
a school with such a disease. 60
The School Board appealed to the United States Supreme Court,
which granted certiorari. 61 The Supreme Court further found that Ar-
line was handicapped under the Rehabilitation Act. 62 The Court
found that she suffered a "physical impairment" in that her tuberculo-
sis affected her respiratory system.63 This "impairment" required hos-
pitalization on numerous occasions, thereby substantially limiting one
or more of her major life activities. 64 Moreover, the Court noted that
discrimination on the basis of contagiousness was contradictory to the
purpose of the Act.65 The Court noted that Congress, in enacting sec-
tion 504, realized "[f]ew aspects of a handicap give rise to the same
level of public fear and misapprehension as contagiousness. '66
However, because the Act requires a finding not only that the plain-
tiff is "an individual with a disability" but is also "otherwise quali-
fied," the Court remanded for a further factual finding. 67 The Court
directed that the following test be used to determine if an individual
with a contagious disease is otherwise qualified, or if the individual
poses a direct threat to the health of others. 68 The Court directed
district courts to make an individualized inquiry, based on the reason-
able medical judgments of public health officials, as to:
(a) the nature of the risk (how the disease is transmitted), (b) the
duration of the risk (how long is the carrier infectious), (c) the se-
59. Arline, 480 U.S. at 277.
60. Id.
61. Sch. Bd. v. Arline, 475 U.S. 1118 (1986).
62. Sch. Bd. v. Arline, 480 U.S. 273, 281 (1987).
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Id. at 284-85 (noting "[t]he fact that some persons who have contagious diseases may pose
a serious health threat to others under certain circumstances does not justify excluding from the
coverage of the act all persons with actual or perceived contagious diseases").
66. Id. at 284. However, the Supreme Court specifically left open the question whether AIDS
is to be considered a disability under the Rehabilitation Act. Id. at 282 n.7. Justice Brennan's
majority opinion noted:
This case does not present. and we therefore do not reach, the questions whether a
carrier of a contagious disease such as AIDS could be considered to have a physical
impairment, or whether such a person could be considered. solely on the basis of conta-
giousness, a handicapped person as defined by the Act.
Arline, 480 U.S. at 282 n.7. The Court answered the question that a person with HIV (even in
the asymptomatic stage) is indeed a person with a disability in Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S. 624,
643-44 (1998). See infra notes 165-174 and accompanying text.
67. Arline. 480 U.S. at 288-89.
68. Id. at 288.
[Vol. 52:945
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verity of the risk (what is the potential harm to third parties) and
(d) the probabilities the disease will be transmitted and will cause
varying degrees of harm.69
Because the factual finding of the district court did not provide
enough information to apply the above test, the Supreme Court af-
firmed the Eleventh Circuit's decision to remand to the district court
on the question of whether Arline was otherwise qualified to teach. 70
Congress later amended the Rehabilitation Act to include the above
four-part test, and the "direct threat" exception was born. 71
3. The Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990
The shortfall of the Rehabilitation Act was that it only pertained to
recipients of federal funds.72 No protection was offered to persons
with disabilities from discrimination in the private sector or in most
state-run agencies. 73 Protections for individuals with disabilities also
fell short as the Supreme Court held that persons with mental disabili-
ties were neither a suspect nor quasi-suspect class for purposes of fed-
eral equal protection analysis. 74  Therefore, as long as the
69. Id. The Court adopted this test from an anicus curiae brief submitted by the American
Medical Association. Id.
70. Id. at 289.
71. The Rehabilitation Act was amended and currently reads: "For the purposes of sections
[503 and 504] ... [individuals with a disability] does not include an individual who has a currently
contagious disease or infection and who, by reason of such disease or infection, would constitute
a direct threat to the health or safety of other individuals .... " 29 U.S.C. § 705 (20)(D) (1994).
72. 29 U.S.C. § 794(a) (1999). The Rehabilitation Act reads "[n]o otherwise qualified individ-
ual with a disability in the United States . . . shall. solely, by reason of her or his disability, be
excluded from the participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination
under any program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance .... " Id. (emphasis added).
73. Weber, supra note 36. at 1109-10 (explaining that the Rehabilitation Act is applicable to
any entity that is a recipient of federal funds). This may be distinguished from Title 1I of the
Americans with Disabilities Act. which applies to all entities of state or local governments re-
gardless of whether or not federal funds are received. Id.
74. City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Cir., Inc.. 473 U.S. 432 (1985). However. the ADA
states:
[lindividuals with disabilities are a discrete and insular minority who have been faced
with restrictions and limitations, subjected to a history of purposeful unequal treat-
ment, and relegated to a position of political powerlessness in our society, based on
characteristics that are beyond the control of such individuals and resulting from stere-
otypic assumptions not truly indicative of the individual ability of such individuals to
participate in, and contribute to, society.
42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(7) (1994). From this finding, one may argue that individuals with disabili-
ties do indeed comprise a suspect classification for equal protection analysis. See United States
v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144. 153-54 n.4 (1938). The Supreme Court has. however, ad-
dressed the consequences private fears and prejudices have on protected liberty interests. See
Palmore v. Sidoti. 466 U.S. 429. 433 (1984). This is significant to the ADA, as a major goal of the
ADA is to protect individuals from such fears. See 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(7). See infra notes 297-
302 and accompanying text.
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discriminatory agency was not funded federally, persons with disabili-
ties had little protection. 75
In 1990, Congress enacted the Americans with Disabilities Act,
which has five titles.76 The titles pertinent to this analysis are the first
three, with an emphasis on Title II. Title I prohibits discrimination in
the employment context. 77 Title II prohibits disability discrimination
in the context of public services. 78 Title II expanded the application of
section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act by not basing protection on
whether the entity was a recipient of federal funds. 79 Thus, Title II
prohibits all state and local entities from discriminating on the basis
of an individual's disability, regardless of funding.s0 Title III pro-
hibits disability discrimination in the context of public accommoda-
tions. 81
75. Cf. 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(4) (1994).
76. Title I of the ADA protects individuals with disabilities from discrimination in the employ-
ment context. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12111-12117 (1994 & Supp. 2002). Title 1I protects individuals with
disabilities from discrimination in the context of public services. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12131-12165 (1994
& Supp. 2002). Title Ill applies to disability discrimination in the context of public accommoda-
tions. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12181-12189 (1994 & Supp. 2002). Title IV provides for protection in tele-
communications. 47 U.S.C. §§ 12190-12200 (1994 & Supp. 2002). Title V contains miscellaneous
provisions. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12201-12213 (1994 & Supp. 2002).
77. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12111-12117.
78. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12131-12165. A state-run foster care program is an example of a public ser-
vice under Title II. See County of Ctr.. 242 F.3d at 445.
79. The Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990: Hearing on H.R. 2434 Before the House
Comm. on Educ. and Labor, 101st Cong. (1990), reprinted in I LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE
AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT OF 1990, COMM. ON EnijC. AND LABOR. U.S. HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES, at 624. Congress noted:
The ADA extends the protections of section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, prohibiting
discrimination in federally funded programs, to all programs, activities and services of
State or local governments, regardless of the receipt of Federal financial assistance.
Section 504 served as the fist step toward breaking down the barriers that, for too long,
kept persons with disabilities out of the American mainstream. By extending section
504 to all public entities, we benefit from the successful history and lessons of the Reha-
bilitation Act. By enacting title II. we cover those remaining government entities that
were not covered in the past.
Id.
80. Title II mandates that "no qualified individual with a disability shall, by reason of such
disability, be excluded from participation or be denied the benefits of the services, programs, or
activities of a public entity, or be subjected to discrimination by any such entity." 42 U.S.C.
§ 12132 (1994). See also 42 U.S.C. § 12131 (1994) (defining a "public entity" as: "(A) any State
or local government: (B) any department. agency. special purpose district, or other instrumental-
ity of a State or States or local government: and (C) the National Railroad Passenger Corpora-
tion. and any commuter authority . . ."). See generally Weber, supra note 36. at 1089: John J.
Coleman, III & Marcel L. Debruge. A Practitioner's Introduction to ADA Title I. 45 ALA. L.
REV. 55 (1983).
81. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12181-12189 (1995). Included among Title Ill public accommodations are:
inn[s] and hotel[s], ... restaurant[s], bar[s] .... theatre[s], concert hall[s], stadium[s], ...
auditorium[s]. convention center[s]. lecture hall[s] .... baker[ies], grooery store[s],
clothing store[s], hardware store[s]. shopping center[s]. . . . laundr ,mat[s], dry-
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As public fears and discrimination against persons with HIV or
AIDS grew in the mid to late 1980s, the ADA was essential to protect
infected persons from discrimination. 82 Many HIV-positive individu-
als lobbied for the passage of the ADA. 3 Congress heard testimony
from many infected individuals regarding the discrimination they ex-
perienced, from employment situations 84  to everyday social
interactions. s5
In passing the ADA, Congress included the same direct threat lan-
guage that was developed in Arline and later written into section 504
of the Rehabilitation Act. 86 Title I defines a direct threat as "a signifi-
cant risk to the health or safety of others that cannot be eliminated by
reasonable accommodation. '8 7 The use of the same language that the
Supreme Court used in Arline shows that Congress intended to in-
clude the Arline factor test in the ADA. 8 Title III also incorporates
the direct threat defense.8 9 Title II, which applies to public services
and will be discussed in detail below, did not incorporate the direct
cleanerls], bank[s], barber shop[s] .... funeral parlor[s], gas station[s], [law, insurance
and accountant offices], pharmac[ies], health care provider [offices], hospitals and other
service establishments.... terminal[s], depot[s] [and] other station[s] specified for pub-
lic transportation .... museum[s], librar[ies] and galler[ies] . . . park[s], zoo[s]. amuse-
ment park[s] and other places of recreation. . . . nursery, elementary, secondary,
undergraduate, or post graduate private school[s], day care center[s]. senior . . .
center[s], homeless shelter[s], food bank[s]. adoption agenc[ies]. or other social service
establishments. . . . gymnasium[s]. health spa[s], bowling alley[s], golf course[s], or
other places of exercise or recreation.
42 U.S.C. § 12181(7) (1994).
82. Oversight Hearing on H.R. 4498, Americans with Disabilities Act of 1988 Before the Sub-
comm. on Select Educ. of the Comm. on Educ. and Labor. 100th Cong. (1990), reprinted in I
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT OF 1990, COMM. ON EDUC.
AND LABOR. U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 101ST CONG.. at 1236-39 (hearing testimony of
HIV infected individuals and the discrimination they have faced in the realm of housing and
employment). For an explanation of how HIV/AIDS is a disability under the ADA (even in the
asymptomatic stage) see Bragdon. 524 U.S. at 630-37 (explaining how HIV constitutes a "physi-
cal or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more major life activities" from the
moment of infection). See supra note 24.
83. See H.R. REP. No. 101-472. at 24-28 (1990).
84. Oversight Hearing on H.R. 4498. Americans with Disabilities Act of 1988 Before the Sub-
comm. on Select Educ. of the Comm. on Educ. and Labor, 100th Cong. (1990), reprinted in I
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT OF 1990, COMM. ON EDuc.
AND LABOR. U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 101ST CONG.. at 1236-39 (statement of Jerry
Johnson. Names Project New England).
85. Id. at 1259 (statement of James Brooks, Paralegal, Disability Law Center).
86. See 42 U.S.C. § 12111(3) (1994) (defining a 'direct threat" for purposes of Title 1).
87. Id.
88. H.R. REP. No. 101 -485, pt. 3, at 34. cited in County of Ctr.. 242 F.3d at 447 (noting "Itihe
Committee intends to codify the direct threat standard used by the Supreme Court in School
Board of Nassau County v. Arline"). See also Estate of Mauro v. Borgess Med. Ctr.. 137 F.3d
398, 402 (6th Cir. 1998).
89. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(3) (1994):
2003]
DEPAUL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 52:945
threat defense into the language of the title.90 However, the Depart-
ment of Justice (DOJ), which has regulatory authority over Title II,91
has interpreted that the direct threat exception applies to Title 11.92
C. The Direct Threat Exception in Application
Many defendants in either ADA or Rehabilitation Act cases have
relied on the direct threat defense, especially in cases where the al-
leged discrimination was on account of an individual's HIV or AIDS
status.93  Courts have had to decide, using the Arline factor test,
whether HIV-positive health care workers are "otherwise qualified"
to continue their jobs or whether they pose a "direct threat" to the
health and safety of others.94 The direct threat defense has also come
up in the context of prison segregation of HIV-positive inmates 95 as
well as whether an HIV-positive teacher is "otherwise qualified" to
teach young students. 96
As will be discussed in detail below, the Court of Appeals for the
Third Circuit in Doe v. County of Centre has noted that when weigh-
ing the Arline factors to determine if a contagious disease poses a di-
rect threat to others, federal courts of appeals have approached the
issue in one of two ways. 9 7 Some courts will find a significant risk of
transmission, and thereby invoke the direct threat exception if there is
any "amount of risk through a 'specific and theoretically sound means
Nothing in this subchapter shall require an entity to permit an individual to participate
in or benefit from the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advan- tages, and accommo-
dations of such entity where such individual poses a direct threat to the health and
safety of others. The term "direct threat" means a significant risk to the health or safety
of others that cannot be eliminated by a modification of policies, practices, or proce-
dures or by the provision of auxiliary aids or services.
90. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 12131-12165 (1994 & Supp. 2002).
91. See Coleman & Debruge, supra note 80, at 57.
92. 28 C.F.R. pt. 35, app. A (2001), cited in County of Ctr., 242 F.3d at 447 (stating "[a] 'direct
threat' is a significant risk to the health or safety of others that cannot be eliminated by a modifi-
cation of policies, practices, or procedures, or by the provision of auxiliary aids or services").
93. County of Ctr., 242 F.3d at 437. See generally Onishea v. Hopper, 171 F.3d 1289 (11 th Cir.
1999). cert. denied. 528 U.S. 1114 (2000), cited in County of Ctr.. 242 F.3d at 450: Abbott v.
Bragdon, 163 F.3d 87 (1st Cir. 1998); Estate of Mauro v. Borgess Med. Ctr.. 137 F.3d 398 (6th
Cir. 1998), cert. denied. 525 U.S. 815 (1998); Doe v. Univ. of Md. Med. Sys. Corp., 50 F.3d 1261
(4th Cir. 1995): Bradley v. Univ. Tex. M.D. Anderson Cancer Ctr., 3 F.3d 922 (5th Cir. 1993),
cert. denied. 510 U.S. 1119 (1994); Martinez v. Sch. Bd.. 861 F.2d 1502 (1lth Cir. 1988): Chalk v.
United States Dist. Court, 840 F.2d 701 (9th Cir. 1988).
94. See generally Estate of Mauro v. Borgess Med. Ctr.. 137 F.3d 398 (6th Cir. 1998), cert.
denied. 525 U.S. 815 (1998), cited in County of Ctr.. 242 F.3d at 450: Doe v. Univ. Md. Med. Sys.
Corp., 50 F.3d 1261 (4th Cir. 1995); Bradley v. Univ. Tex. M.D. Anderson Cancer Ctr.. 3 F.3d 922
(5th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 1119 (1994).
95. Hopper. 171 F.3d at 1289.
96. Chalk. 840 F.2d at 701.
97. County of Ctr.. 242 F.3d at 450. See infra notes 10 1-183 and accompanying text.
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of transmission.'1, 98 Other courts will invoke the direct threat excep-
tion using a "more exacting standard, requiring some actual risk of
transmission including documented cases." 99  Because the direct
threat defense is applied in basically the same way if the case was
brought under the ADA or Rehabilitation Act, cases brought under
either act will be discussed together. 100
1. Cases Where "Any Amount of Risk Through a 'Specific and
Theoretically Sound Means of Transmission' Constitutes a
Significant Risk" t0'
In the following cases, courts have found that a significant risk of
transmission of a contagious disease exists (and thus the direct threat
exception applies) in situations where any risk of transmission may be
shown, even if only through a "specific and theoretically sound means
of transmission." 0 2
a. Bradley v. University of Texas M.D. Anderson Cancer Center'0 3
In Bradley, a surgical assistant at the University of Texas M.D. An-
derson Cancer Center was reassigned to a non-medical position after
revealing to a local newspaper that he was HIV-positive. t0 4 Bradley
brought suit against the hospital under section 504 of the Rehabilita-
tion Act, among other things1t 5 The Court of Appeals for the Fifth
Circuit considered whether Bradley was "otherwise qualified" to be a
surgical technician.' 0 6 The court held that Bradley was not otherwise
qualified for the job because of the "catastrophic consequences" his
infection would cause to patients if they were infected with his dis-
ease. 107 The Fifth Circuit reasoned that, under the Arline factor test,
there was a significant risk that Bradley would transmit HIV to
others. 08 The court's decision focused on the fourth Arline factor, the
98. County of Ctr.. 242 F.3d at 450 (quoting Onishea. 171 F.3d at 1297-99).
99. Id. at 450.
100. See Univ. ofMd. Med. Sys. Corp., 50 F.3d at 1264 n.9 (noting that because the ADA and
Rehabilitation Act have language that is "substantially the same," a single analysis may be done
applying both statutes): Aden, supra note 7, at 408.
101. County of Ctr., 242 F.3d at 450 (quoting Onishea. 171 F.3d at 1297-99).
102. Id. (quoting Onishea. 171 F.3d at 1297-99).
103. 3 F.3d 922 (5th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 1119 (1994).
104. Id. at 923. Bradley was reassigned to a position in the purchasing department. Id.
105. Id. Bradley also brought suit under the First Amendment since he believed he was fired
for revealing his health status to a local newspaper. Id.
106. Id. at 924.
107. Bradle,, 3 F.3d at 924.
108. Id.
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"probability of transmitting the virus."' 9 The court found that Brad-
ley's job required that he come within inches of open wounds during
surgery, as he would need to place his hands in an open body cavity as
often as once a day.110 Thus, it was theoretically possible that Brad-
ley's blood could come into contact with the body cavity or open
wound of a patient, thereby transmitting the HIV virus.11' The Fifth
Circuit did not, however, base this finding of a significant risk on any
documented cases of health care worker to patient transmission. 1 2
b. Doe v. University of Maryland Medical Systems Corp. 113
In University of Maryland Medical Systems Corp., a third-year
neurosurgical resident, Dr. Doe, who was stuck by a needle contami-
nated with the blood of a patient believed to have HIV, was sus-
pended from surgery after he tested positive for the virus.114 Doe was
later terminated from his position.1 15 Doe brought suit under, among
other things, section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act and Title II of the
ADA alleging discrimination from a public entity.' 16 The Court of
Appeals for the Fourth Circuit considered whether Doe's condition
constituted a significant risk or direct threat that could not be elimi-
nated by reasonable accommodation. 17 The court held that Doe
posed a direct threat to the health and safety of others that could not
be eliminated by reasonable accommodation. 18 Like Bradley,119 the
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. Id. The court noted that although the CDC found the risk of transmission from an HIV-
infected health care worker to a patient smaller than the risk of transmitting Hepatitis B. the fact
that Bradley was constantly around sharp instruments made the risk of transmission even
greater. Id. See infra text accompanying notes 353-361.
112. Bradley. 3 F.3d at 924. The Fifth Circuit noted that even though the risk of transmission
was small, it was not small enough to overcome the "catastrophic consequences of an accident."
Id.
113. 50 F.3d 1261 (4th Cir. 1995).
114. Id. at 1262.
115. Id. at 1263. The defendant University suspended Doe from practice while awaiting rec-
ommendations from a panel comprised of experts on blood-borne pathogens. Id. at 1262. The
panel recommended that Doe be allowed to return to work as long as he followed certain pre-
cautions. Id. These precautions included forbidding Doe from participating in procedures which
use "exposed wire" as the panel found the risk to patients to be too great that the HIV virus
would be transmitted. Id. It was also recommended that Doe be required to report to a supervi-
sor if his blood ever came into contact with the "non-intact skin" of a patient. Univ. of Md. Med.
Sys., 50 F.3d at 1262. The expert panel did not find it necessary that Doe receive the "informed
consent of his patients" before surgery. Id. The University, however, did not follow the recom-
mendations of the panel but instead terminated Doe after he refused an offer to be reassigned.
Id.
116. Id. at 1264.
117. Id. at 1265.
118. Id. at 1266.
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court's determination that the direct threat exception applied cen-
tered on the fourth Arline factor, the probability of transmission. 20
The Fourth Circuit reasoned that it should not substitute its judgment
for that of the University, and that the University had the ability to
decide whether or not Doe's responsibilities were "exposure-prone"
under CDC guidelines.' 2' The CDC gave authority to individual hos-
pitals to determine which techniques were "exposure-prone."1 22 Like
Bradley, the court allowed discrimination to take place on the basis of
a theoretical risk of transmission. 123
c. Estate of Mauro v. Borgess Medical Center124
Estate of Mauro is another case in which a court decided that a
health care worker's termination was legal because it was believed
that the worker's HIV-positive status posed a direct threat to the
health and safety of others.12 5 Again, the deciding court's decision
was focused on the fourth Arline factor-the probability of transmis-
sion. 126 The Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit considered
whether Mauro was otherwise qualified for his job as a surgical techni-
119. See supra notes 103-112 and accompanying text.
120. Univ. of Md. Med. Sys., 50 F.3d at 1265. The University argued that "the catastrophic
effects of infection with HIV combined with a minimal but nevertheless ascertainable risk of
transmission form a sufficient basis upon which to conclude that Doe is not otherwise qualified
for a residency in neurosurgery." Id. Doe countered that although there does exist a risk that he
will transmit HIV to one of his patients, that risk is "so infinitesimal that it cannot, regardless of
the degree of harm involved, be considered a significant risk." Id. at 1266.
121. Id. The CDC has classified some procedures as "exposure-prone." Id. at 1263. The
CDC has not identified those procedures it finds to be "exposure -prone:" instead the CDC has
relied on the following definition:
Characteristics of exposure-prone procedures include digital palpation of a needle tip
in a body cavity or the simultaneous presence of the HCW's [health care worker's]
fingers and a needle or other sharp instrument or object in a poorly visualized or highly
confined anatomic site. Performance of exposure-prone procedures presents a recog-
nized risk of percutaneous injury to the HCW. and-if such an injury occurs-the
HCW's blood is likely to contact the patient's body cavity, subcutaneous tissues, and/or
mucous membranes.
Id. at 1263 (quoting Centers for Disease Control, Recommendations for Preventing Transmission
of the Human Immunodeficiency Virus and Hepatitis B Virus to Patients During Exposure-Prone
Invasive Procedures, 40 MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WKLY.. July 12. 1991. at 3-4). The court
noted that the CDC recommended that HIV-positive surgeons be allowed to practice invasive
procedures, but may be prevented from practicing "exposure-prone" procedures. Univ. of Md.
Med. Sys., 50 F.3d at 1263.
122. Id. at 1264.
123. Id.
124. 137 F.3d 398 (6th Cir. 1998), cert. denied. 525 U.S. 815 (1998).
125. Id. at 407. The plaintiff in Estate of Mauro brought suit under section 504 of the Rehabil-
itation Act and the ADA when he was terminated from his position as an operating room techni-
cian after it was revealed that he was HIV-positive. Id. at 400.
126. Id. at 403. See supra notes 109. 120, and accompanying text.
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cian or whether he posed a direct threat to the health and safety of
others. 127 The court found that because Mauro would sometimes
need to place his fingers in the body cavity of a patient during surgery,
which constituted a theoretical way that HIV could be transmitted, he
posed a direct threat or significant risk under both the Rehabilitation
Act and ADA.1 28 The court, in deferring to "reasonable medical judg-
ments"' 29 of public health officials as required by Arline, found that
Mauro's position mandated that he participate in "exposure-prone
procedures" under CDC guidelines.1 30 Thus, agreeing with the Fourth
and Fifth Circuits that no documented cases were necessary for a risk
of transmission to be "significant," the Sixth Circuit affirmed the dis-
trict court's grant of summary judgment in favor of the defendant hos-
pital even though the actual risk of transmission from an HIV-positive
surgeon to a patient is between 1 in 42,000 and 1 in 420,000.131 A
dissenting opinion noted that the likelihood of transmission from an
HIV-positive operating room technician would be far less, as techni-
cians do not have as much contact with the patient as does the
surgeon.132
d. Onishea v. Hopper 33
In Onishea, an HIV disability discrimination case not centered on
the health care profession, prison inmates argued that the Alabama
prison system's segregation plan violated section 504 of the Rehabili-
tation Act.1 34 The district court ruled that under the Rehabilitation
Act, HIV-positive inmates were not otherwise qualified to participate
in programs with the general population because there was a signifi-
127. Estate of Mauro, 137 F.3d at 402.
128. Id. at 406-07. Mauro testified in the lower court:
Usually if I have my hands near the wound, it would be to like, on an abdominal inci-
sion, to kind of put your finger in and hold-kind of pull down on the muscle tissue and
that-where the two met in like a V shape at the bottom and the top, and pull that
back. But it happened very, very rarely because they had retractors to do that.
Id. at 404.
129. Arline, 480 U.S. at 288.
130. Estate of Mauro. 137 F.3d at 404.
131. Id. at 405. This figure came from CDC reports. Id.
132. Id. at 409-10 (Boggs, J., dissenting).
133. 171 F.3d 1289 (11th Cir. 1999). cert. denied, 528 U.S. 1114 (2000). The Eleventh Circuit
upheld its application of the direct threat exception as outlined in Onishea and its finding that
the exception is made out if it is evident: -(1) that a certain event can occur and (2) that
according to reliable medical opinion the event can transmit the disease" and thus held that an
HIV-positive dental hygienist posed a direct threat to his patients. Waddell v. Valley Forge
Dental Assocs., 276 F.3d 1275, 1281 (11th Cir. 2001) (quoting Onishea, 171 F.3d at 1299).
134. Onishea, 171 F.3d at 1292. The prison system segregated inmates by sex, then by HIV
status. Id. This was done for the purpose of preventing the spread of AIDS in prisons. Id.
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cant risk that HIV-positive inmates would infect HIV-negative in-
mates, and thus granted summary judgment in favor of the defendant
prison system. 135 The Eleventh Circuit considered whether there was
a significant risk that HIV transmission would occur in a non-segre-
gated prison setting. 136 The Eleventh Circuit, following the "cautious
approach"' 37 of the Fourth, Fifth and Sixth Circuits, 138 held that be-
cause the transmission of HIV would result in death, HIV-positive in-
mates posed a significant risk to the health and safety of others under
the Rehabilitation Act. 139 The court reasoned that because the evi-
dence presented to the district court showed both the possibility that a
transmitting event could occur (such as unprotected sex, needle shar-
ing, or bloodshed from fist fights) 140 and that medical opinion recog-
nized that such an event could transmit HIV, a significant risk was
presented.' 4' Thus, HIV-positive inmates, though disabled, were not
otherwise qualified to participate in programs with the general
population. 142
2. Cases Where "Some Actual Risk of Transmission Including
Documented Cases"'43 Constitutes a Significant Risk
In contrast to the cases discussed above, 44 the following cases have
applied a "more exacting standard"' 45 to ascertain what a significant
135. Id. at 1293. Different rehabilitative, religious, and educational programs were offered to
the general population than were offered to inmates with HIV. Id. at 1292-93.
136. Id. at 1293. This case marks the second time the Eleventh Circuit has addressed the
issue. The court of appeals had previously remanded this case back to the district court to make
specific findings to determine if the plaintiffs were eligible for relief. See Harris v. Thigpen. 941
F.2d 1495, 1521 (11th Cir. 1991).
137. Onishea, 171 F.3d at 1298. The Eleventh Circuit favored this "cautious approach," be-
cause it felt first, that this approach protected persons with disabilities from "the unfounded
fears and prejudices that Congress met to uproot" and second, that this approach "avoids the
absurd conclusion that Congress has decreed even a few painful deaths in service of the Act's
noble goals." Id. at 1298-99 (emphasis and citations omitted).
138. See supra notes 103-132 and accompanying text.
139. Onishea. 171 F.3d at 1297-99.
140. Id. at 1299.
141. Id. This case departs from previous decisions of the Eleventh Circuit when faced with
the issue of the direct threat defense under the Rehabilitation Act. In Martinez v. Sch. Bd.. 861
F.2d 1502 (1 lth Cir. 1988). when faced with the issue of whether an HIV-positive mentally hand-
icapped seven-year old girl posed a direct threat to her classmates under the Rehabilitation Act,
the Eleventh Circuit held that the district court's finding of a "remote theoretical possibility"
that HIV would be transmitted did not rise to the " 'significant' risk level that is required for [the
girl] to be excluded from the ... classroom." Martinez. 861 F.2d at 1506 (citing Arline. 107 S. Ct.
at 1131 n.16).
142. Onishea. 171 F.3d at 1297-99.
143. County of Cr.. 242 F.3d 450.
144. See supra text accompanying notes 1011-142.
145. County of Ctr.. 242 F.3d at 450.
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risk/direct threat must constitute. In the cases discussed below, courts
have determined the existence of a significant risk requires "some ac-
tual risk of transmission including documented cases."' 146
a. Chalk v. United States District Court147
In Chalk, an HIV-positive teacher of hearing-impaired students was
reassigned to an administrative position after his diagnosis became
known. 148 On motion for a preliminary injunction, the United States
District Court for the Central District of California found that Chalk
would not likely succeed on the merits of his section 504 claim be-
cause he posed a significant risk to others based on the Arline factor
test. 149 The district court found that although Chalk presented evi-
dence regarding the nature and transmission of AIDS, including over
one hundred articles from prestigious medical journals t50 and declara-
tions from AIDS experts, 151 medical science did not yet know enough
about AIDS and its transmission to say that Chalk did not pose a sig-
nificant risk to others. 152
146. Id.
147. 840 F.2d 701 (9th Cir. 1988).
148. Id. at 703. Chalk argued his reassignment violated section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act
and filed for a preliminary and permanent injunction in order to prohibit the Department of
Education from barring him from the classroom. Id. The district court denied Chalk's motion
for a preliminary injunction. Id.
149. Id. at 707.
150. Id. at 706. Chalk presented evidence regarding HIV/AIDS, the nature of the disease.
and how the virus is transmitted. Chalk, 840 F.2d at 706. The evidence reported that HIV is a
retrovirus that attacks an individual's immune system. Id. Infected individuals may not show
any symptoms. Id. Known symptoms include: "swollen lymph nodes, fever, weight loss, fatigue
and night sweats." Id. An infected individual's immune system will become so weakened that
the person may become susceptible to various infections. Id. It is these infections that often
result in death. Id. The reports Chalk presented included information that HIV transmission is
known to occur through one of the following three ways: (1) through unprotected sexual contact
with a person testing positive for HIV antibodies: (2) through invasive exposure to blood or
other body fluids of an infected person: or (3) through vertical transmission (i.e. from mother to
child). Chalk, 840 F.2d at 706. One report relied upon by Chalk noted that at the time of trial.
there were no known cases of HIV transmission by casual contact, and no HIV cases reported in
the United States have occurred between children in either schools, day care. or foster care
settings. Id.
151. Id. The American Medical Association submitted an amicus brief supporting Chalk. Id.
In its brief, the American Medical Association reported that "there is no evidence in the rele-
vant medical literature that demonstrates any appreciable risk of transmitting the AIDS virus
under the circumstances likely to occur in the ordinary school setting." Id. at 707. The Orange
County Department of Education, however, presented an expert witness, Dr. Steven Armen-
trout, who found that "there is a probability, small though it is. that there are vectors of trans-
mission as yet not clearly defined." Id.
152. Chalk. 840 F.2d at 707.
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The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed, finding that
Chalk would likely succeed on the merits of his section 504 claim.153
The Ninth Circuit noted that the district court, in not following Ar-
line's direction to defer to medical judgments of health officials,
placed an impossible burden of proof on Chalk. 154 The Ninth Circuit
went on to note that no reported AIDS cases in the United States
were known to have been transmitted from one child to another in
situations of foster care, day care, or school. 155 Thus, the Ninth Cir-
cuit was hesitant to rule that Chalk's condition posed a significant
threat to children in his classroom without any evidence that HIV
transmission had occurred before in a similar setting. 56
b. Abbott v. Bragdon157
Bragdon was a milestone in HIV/AIDS discrimination cases. The
case, starting in the United States District Court for the District of
Maine, went all the way to the United States Supreme Court.158 Ab-
bott had gone to see her dentist Dr. Bragdon.' 59 Upon finding a cav-
ity that needed filling, Bragdon informed Abbott about his policy
against filling cavities of HIV-positive patients in his office; instead
preferring to fill them at the hospital where he had access to equip-
ment that would decrease his risk of becoming infected. 160 Abbott
refused to comply with this policy and brought suit under Title III of
the ADA, claiming that Bragdon discriminated against her based
solely on her HIV status.t 6' Bragdon attempted, unsuccessfully, to
raise the direct threat exception as a defense. 162 The United States
District Court for the District of Maine granted summary judgment in
favor of Abbott, finding that her asymptomatic HIV constituted a dis-
153. Id. at 709.
154. Id. The Ninth Circuit found that "[l]ittle in science can be proved with complete cer-
tainty. and section 504 does not require such a test.- Id. at 707.
155. Id. at 708.
156. 1d.
157. 163 F.3d 87 (1st Cir. 1998).
158. Bragdon v. Abbott. 524 U.S. 624 (1998). It was this case where the Supreme Court set-
tled a circuit split and decided that asymptomatic HIV could be considered a disability under the
ADA. Id. at 641.
159. Id. at 628. She filled out on a medical evaluation form and revealed that she was HIV-
positive. Id. at 628-29.
160. Id. at 629. Bragdon would not charge more for this procedure, but Abbott would be
responsible for the hospital costs of the visit. Id.
161. Bragdon. 524 U.S. at 629.
162. See id. at 630.
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ability under the ADA.163 The Court of Appeals for the First Circuit
affirmed.' 64
The United States Supreme Court affirmed that asymptomatic HIV
could constitute a disability under the ADA. 165 The Court ruled that
asymptomatic HIV was "a physical or mental impairment that sub-
stantially limits one or more of the major life activities of such individ-
uals" 166 under one of the ADA's definitions of disability. 167 First, the
Court found that HIV was a "physical impairment" because the virus
began to infect an individual's immune system at the moment of infec-
tion, even if these symptoms are not manifested for many years. 168
Second, the "life activity" that HIV placed a substantial limitation
upon was Abbott's ability to reproduce and to bear children. 169 Third,
the Court decided that Abbott's physical impairment placed a sub-
stantial limitation on the major life activity of reproduction.170  The
Court reasoned that this was so because an HIV-positive woman who
tries to conceive a child imposes on her partner a significant risk of
infection.' 7 1 This risk is also posed to her child during pregnancy and
childbirth. 17 2
The Supreme Court, however, remanded the case back to the First
Circuit to decide the issue of whether Abbott presented a direct threat
to Bragdon, thereby justifying his discrimination under the ADA. 173
The Court ruled that it was necessary for the First Circuit to deter-
163. Id. The district court also held that Bragdon did not raise any "genuine issue of material
fact" as to whether filing an HIV-positive individual's cavity posed a direct threat to the health
or safety of others. Id.
164. Abbott v. Bragdon, 107 F.3d 934, 939-43 (1st Cir. 1997).
165. Bragdon, 524 U.S. at 641.
166. See 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(A) (1994).
167. Bragdon, 524 U.S. at 631.
168. Id. at 632-37.
169. Id. at 637. See infra note 172 and accompanying text.
170. Bragdon, 524 U.S. at 639.
171. Id.
172. Id. at 640. According to the CDC, "HIV transmission from mother to child during preg-
nancy, labor, and delivery or by breast-feeding has accounted for 91% of all AIDS cases re-
ported among U.S. children." Status of Perinatal HIV Prevention: U.S. Declines Continue, at
http://www.cdc.gov/hiv/pubs/facts/perinatl.htm (last modified Nov. 1999) (on file with DePaul
Law Review).
173. Bragdon, 524 U.S. at 655. In order to guide the First Circuit, the Supreme Court noted
that "[blecause few, if any, activities are risk free, Arline and the ADA do not ask whether a risk
exists, but whether it is significant." Id. at 649. At least one commentator has expressed dissatis-
faction with the Supreme Court's evaluation of the direct threat question posed in the case. See
Leading Cases, 112 HARv. L. REV. 283, 293 (1998) [hereinafter Leading Cases]. This commenta-
tor noted that:
In Bragdon, the Justices differed substantially on whether the risk [of HIV transmis-
sion] was significant. but none of them explained what a "significant" risk is, which
implies that they only "know it when [they] see it." Without a clear and uniform stan-
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mine from conflicting studies presented from both parties whether
Bragdon presented a genuine issue of fact regarding the significance
of risk.' 74
On remand, the First Circuit held that Bragdon did not present a
triable issue of fact regarding risk and affirmed summary judgment in
favor of Abbott. 175 The First Circuit, as it did when it first heard this
case, relied on two studies.1 76 One study was the CDC's Dentistry
Guidelines.1 77 The other was an American Dental Association's Pol-
icy on AIDS, HIV Infection and the Practice of Dentistry.1 78 Both
concluded that if universal precautions were followed, the risk of fill-
dard. trial court judges finding no significant risk as a matter of law will undoubtedly be
relying more on their own personal perspectives than on articulated legal standards.
Leading Cases, supra (citations omitted). The Supreme Court, however, did affirm Arline's re-
quirement that a finding of significant risk "be based on medical or other objective evidence."
Bragdon. 524 U.S. at 649. For an interpretation on how courts have construed the direct threat
question after Bragdon, see infra note 174.
174. Bragdon, 524 U.S. at 655. Onishea was decided after Bragdon. When faced with the
direct threat question, the Eleventh Circuit found the following guidance from the Supreme
Court's decision in Bragdon:
We know that the relevant scientific knowledge is that at the time of the discrimination:
that an unreasonable offer of accommodation merits no weight: that public health
statements recommending certain precautions are of scant value because they do "not
assess the level of risk": that professional organizations' opinions may be too inter-
twined with matters (such as ethics) to give objective medical evaluations of risk: that
the testimony of health experts may be of some value: that inconclusive scientific stud-
ies deserve little weight, that evidence of seven cases of patient-to-doctor transmission
is not necessarily sufficient. "standing alone" to show the risk to be significant ....
Onishea, 171 F.3d at 1298 (citations omitted). See supra text accompanying notes 133-142.
175. Abbott v. Bragdon. 163 F.3d 87. 90 (1st Cir. 1998).
176. Id. at 88.
177. Id. The CDC Guidelines stated that using universal precautions "should reduce the risk
of disease transmitted in the dental environment." Id. at 89 (quoting 1993 CDC Dentistry
Guidelines). So-called "universal precautions" include "the routine use of barriers (such as
gloves and/or goggles) when anticipating contact with blood or body fluids, washing hands and
other skin surfaces immediately after contact with blood or body fluids, and the careful handling
and disposing of sharp instruments during and after use." Preventing Occupational HIV T'ans-
mission to Heahlhcare Personnel, at http://www.cdc.gov/hiv/pubs/facts/hcwprev.htm (last updated
Sept. 19. 2001) (on file with DePaul Law Review). A 1986 version of the Guidelines found that
following universal precautions was an effective way to prevent the spread of blood borne vi-
ruses, including the HIV virus. Bragdon, 163 F.3d at 89. A 1987 version of the guidelines found
that following universal precautions eliminated the need to follow previously endorsed precau-
tions when handling blood. Id. The First Circuit did not find that a 1993 version of the CDC
Guidelines meant to depart from these views of the earlier guidelines. Id. The First Circuit then
concluded that the type of care Abbott was seeking was safe, as long as universal precautions
were followed. Id.
178. Id. at 88. The Supreme Court had expressed concern that the American Dental Associa-
tion's Policy was based on the organizations view of the ethical obligations and not on scientific
evaluation. as the ADA requires. Id. at 89. See also Bragdon. 524 U.S. at 652.
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ing the cavity of an HIV-positive individual posed an insignificant
risk. 179
Following the Supreme Court's direction, the First Circuit re-ex-
amined Bragdon's evidence, a CDC report that seven dental workers
had possibly been infected with HIV on the job.180 The CDC's defini-
tion of "possible" cases included individuals with unknown modes of
infection.8 " However, since the ADA requires that "direct threat"
risk assessment be decided in light of available medical evidence at
the time the discrimination took place and the CDC's broad definition
of "possible" was available to Bragdon at the time of Abbott's ap-
pointment, these "possible" cases were too speculative to constitute a
genuine issue of fact regarding a direct threat.18 2 Thus, Abbott's evi-
dence that dental treatment was safe made a finding of a direct threat
improper.183
III. SUBJECT OPINION
In Doe v. County of Centre,18 4 the Third Circuit faced a case involv-
ing discrimination against a family because of one member's HIV-pos-
itive status. 8 5 This section will explore how the District Court for the
Middle District of Pennsylvania arrived at its decision to grant sum-
mary judgment in favor of the defendant County, holding that the di-
rect threat exception applied in the situation where a county adoption
program enacted a blanket prohibition against placing foster children
in families with members who have tested HIV-positive. The Third
Circuit's reversal of this finding and its reasoning will also be
discussed.
A. Relevant Facts and the District Court's Decision
The Does provided a family for eight foster children with special
needs, seven of whom were adopted186 One of these children, Adam,
was HIV-positive.18 7 In January of 1998, the Does, seeking to adopt
another child, contacted the defendants, the Office of Children and
Youth Services of Centre County (CYS), the County of Centre, as
179. Bragdon, 163 F.3d at 89.
180. Id. at 89-90.
181. Id. at 90.
182. Id.
183. Id.
184. 242 F.3d 437 (3d Cir. 2001).
185. Id.
186. Id. at 441. Two of these children still lived with the Does. Id.
187. Id. Adam contracted the virus from his birth mother. Id.
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well as individual County Board members and CYS officials (the
County). 188
Centre County operated a foster care program. 189 Out of this oper-
ation arose a statutory duty to investigate foster parents to ensure the
"physical and emotional" health of each foster child. 190 The County
adopted a five-step procedure to become a foster parent.' 91 The sec-
ond step mandated that the County undertake a preliminary home
study. 192 It was during this home study that the Does revealed to the
County that Adam was HIV-positive and had AIDS. 93 This
prompted the County to enact the following blanket prohibition:
C) Placement of Children with Serious Infectious Diseases ... If a
child with a serious infectious disease is placed in a foster home, or
if there is a family member of the foster family who has a serious
infectious disease, only children with the same ... infectious disease
will be considered for placement in that home. The only exception
to this policy would be for a parent/guardian of a child in the care
and custody of [CYS] to sign an informed consent for the placement
of the their non-infected child in such a home .... For this excep-
tion to occur, the foster parents would have to voluntarily agree to
release information to the child's parents that a member of the fos-
ter family has been diagnosed with a specific serious infectious
disease. 194
Under the policy, the Does were ineligible to care for any other
(HIV-negative) foster children because Adam was HIV-positive. The
County enacted this policy after discovering that County foster chil-
dren often displayed physical and sexually abusive characteristics after
188. County of Ctr., 242 F.3d at 443.
189. Id. at 441.
190. Id. at 443. See 23 PA. CONS. STAT. § 6344 (2001), cited in County of Ctr., 242 F.3d at 443
(requiring that prospective foster parents as well as prospective adoptive parents submit to the
administrators of various child care services any criminal history, including a criminal record,
and information to ascertain whether the prospective foster parent or adoptive parent is named
as a registered sex offender): 23 PA. CONS. STAT. § 2530 (2001) (requiring an investigation into
the "home environment, family life, parenting skills, age. physical and mental health, social.
cultural and religious background, facilities and resources of the adoptive parents and their abil-
ity to manage their resources").
191. County of Ctr., 242 F.3d at 443. The first step involves an initial phone call between the
county and the potential foster parents. Id. The second step is a preliminary home study done
by an employee of the county. Id. The third step involves six weeks of pre-service training for
foster parents. Id. The fourth step is a meeting between the potential foster parents and an
employee of the county in order to establish a final assessment. Id. The fifth step involves a
meeting between two employees of the county already involved with the screening of the poten-
tial foster parents in which the potential foster parents' application is approved or disapproved.
Id.
192. County of Ctr.. 242 F.3d at 443.
193. ld.
194. Id. at 444-45.
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being placed with families. 195 Specifically, the County revealed that of
the 125 children the County had in placement, 61 children (49%) dis-
played "behavioral or emotional problems," 30 children (24%) were
sexual abuse victims, 6 children (5%) were sexual abuse perpetrators,
and 9 children (7%) were sexual abuse victims as well as perpetra-
tors.196 The County also noted that because in some instances place-
ment accommodations needed to be made right away, the County
could not identify which children were likely to display such
characteristics. 197
Adam was eleven years old at the time of the enactment of the pol-
icy.198  Adam's disease resulted in various disabilities.' 99 However,
Adam's viral loads of HIV were undetectable. 200 He was at no
greater risk of contracting an opportunistic infection than an HIV-
negative child. 20 1
Adam's parents brought suit against the County under both Title II
of the ADA and section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act in the District
Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania. 20 2 At the district court
level,203 the Does sought a preliminary injunction declaring the
County policy unlawful and asked that they be able to complete the
County's adoption procedures. 20 4 The district court held that because
Adam likely posed a direct threat to other foster children placed in
the Does' home, the Does did not show a reasonable probability of
success on the merits of their case as required to be granted a prelimi-
nary injunction. 20 5
195. Id.
196. Id. (citing Doe v. County of Ctr., 80 F. Supp. 2d 437, 441 (M.D. Pa. 2000)). The County
defined "perpetrator" as "a child who has assaulted another child sexually." Id. at 444. The
County's definition of assault, however, included "fondling and disrobing others." County of
Ctr.. 242 F.3d at 449. However, as noted bv the Third Circuit, these activities do not necessarily
involve a risk of transmitting HIV to another individual. Id.
197. Id.
198. Id. at 441.
199. Id. at 442. Because of his disease. Adam required a feeding tube to aid him with diges-
tion. Id. He has displayed learning disabilities as well as problems communicating. County of
Ctr., 242 F.3d at 442. He also displayed signs of autism. Id. Adam also relied on his parents for
help with personal hygiene. Id. Because of these disabilities, it is likely that Adam would be
considered a person with a disability for purposes of the ADA even before the Supreme Court
decided Bragdon. See Bragdon. 524 U.S. at 630-37.
200. County of Ctr.. 242 F.3d at 442.
201. Id.
202. Doe v. County of Ctr.. 60 F. Supp. 2d 417 (M.D. Pa. 1999).
203. Id.
204. Id. at 419.
205. Id. at 429.
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The district court reasoned that Adam was disabled under both the
Rehabilitation Act and ADA.20 6 The court also concluded that be-
cause Adam's parents were denied the opportunity of "employment"
as foster parents, a public service, based on their "known... relation-
ship or association ' 20 7 with Adam, they were entitled to protection
under both the ADA and section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act.208
The court then considered whether the Does showed a likelihood of
success on the merits of their disability discrimination claim. 20 9 To de-
termine if this standard for a preliminary injunction was made, the
court applied the Arline factor test.210 If Adam likely posed a direct
threat to other children, the Does would not show a reasonable likeli-
hood of success on the merits.2 1 1
As to the first factor, the nature of the risk, the court concluded that
HIV is transmitted through contact with bodily fluids such as "blood,
semen, and vaginal . . . secretions," and that HIV transmission is
known to occur during unprotected "sexual intercourse ... , intrave-
nous drug use, and transfusion of blood and blood products. ' 21 2 For
the second factor, the duration of the risk, the court determined that
once an individual is infected with HIV, that individual carries the
virus until death.213 As to the severity of the risk, the third factor, the
court found that although the harm to others is life threatening, it is
widely accepted that HIV cannot be transmitted through casual
contact. 21 4
Regarding the fourth factor, the probability that the disease will be
transmitted, the district court ruled that there was a "high probability"
that HIV would be transmitted to other children placed in the Doe's
206. Id. at 427 (noting that Adam's disease limits a -major life activity" such as caring for
himself). See 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2) (1995). quoted in County of Ctr., 60 F. Supp. 2d at 427.
207. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(4) (1995). See also 28 C.F.R. § 35.130(g) (2001). quoted in County
of Ctr.. 60) F. Supp. 2d at 427.
208. Counts of Ctr.. 60 F. Supp. 2d at 427. The Supreme Court has previously addressed the
administration of a state run foster care program. See Smith v. Org. of Foster Families for Equal.
and Reform (OFFER). 431 U.S. 816. 826 (1977) (explaining that "[f]oster parents. who are li-
censed by the State or an authorized foster-care agency . . . provide care under a contractual
arrangement with the agency, and are compensated for their services.") (citations omitted).
209. Countly of Ctr.. 60 F. Supp. 2d at 426.
210. Id. at 428-29.
211. Id. at 428.
212. Id.
213. Id. Casual contact, in the district court's definition, includes sharing toothbrushes and
razors. Id.
214. Count' of Ctr.. 60 F. Supp. 2d at 428. The district court noted that no reported AIDS
case in Pennsylvania had been transmitted through casual contact. Id.
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household. 21 5 The court, looking to the statistics of child behavior of-
fered by the County, noted that there was no way of "assuring that
contact between [Adam] and a foster child will be indeed casual. '216
The court further noted that because Adam had mental and physical
deficiencies, he would not be able to defend himself from a sexual
attack from another child. 21 7 The court held that because Adam
posed a threat to other foster children placed with the Does, the pol-
icy reasonably protected foster children from the significant risk of
harm that could result from being placed in a home with someone
with a serious contagious disease. 218 Therefore, the court ruled that a
preliminary injunction was improper.
The County then submitted a motion for summary judgment. 219
The district court granted the motion, finding that, under the Arline
factor test there was no genuine issue of material fact that Adam con-
stituted a direct threat to any HIV-negative foster child placed in the
Does' home. 220 The district court based its decision on the statistics
the County offered regarding sexual and physical behavior among fos-
ter children.221 The court concluded that the County's policy was jus-
tified by the direct threat/significant risk exceptions because other
children might sexually assault Adam and contract HIV.222
B. The Decision of the Third Circuit
The Third Circuit reversed, holding that there was a question of fact
as to whether Adam posed a significant risk of harm to other would be
foster children. 223 Like the cases discussed above, the Third Circuit's
215. Id. at 428-29. The court rejected the Does' evidence showing the non-existence of HIV
transmission in casual contacts. Id. at 429.
216. Id. See supra text accompanying note 196.
217. County of Ctr., 60 F. Supp. 2d at 429.
218. Id. at 428.
219. See County of Ctr.. 80 F. Supp. 2d at 439-40.
220. Id. at 441.
221. Id. See supra note 196 and accompanying text. The United States District Court for the
Middle District of Pennsylvania did not give much weight to the fact that CYS's definition of
"sexual abuse" included activities that pose no risk of HIV transmission. County of Ctr., 80 F.
Supp. 2d at 439-40. The Third Circuit did give this fact weight. finding that the district court
ignored Congress's intention that the direct threat analysis be based on an individualized inquiry
and instead relied upon a "bland and generalized set of statistics." Doe v. County of Ctr., 242
F.3d 437, 449 (3d Cir. 2001). The Third Circuit went on to note that "the statistics broadly define
'sexual abuse' to include activities such as fondling and disrobing that carry no risk of transmit-
ting HIV." Id. See infra notes 256-261 and accompanying text.
222. County of Ctr., 242 F.3d at 448-49.
223. Id. at 441.
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finding of a direct threat centered on the fourth Arline factor, the
probability of transmission.224
The Third Circuit did not agree with the district court's finding that
a high probability of HIV transmission existed when placing foster
children with the Does.225 Rather, the Third Circuit found that a gen-
uine issue of fact was presented regarding this fourth factor. 226 The
Third Circuit based its finding on the following.227
First, the Third Circuit noted that neither the County nor the dis-
trict court participated in an "individualized inquiry" of the existence
of a direct threat as mandated by the ADA.228 Rather, the district
court relied solely on the statistics presented by the County regarding
foster children's propensity toward sexual aggression. 229 The Third
Circuit found this to be "a bland and generalized set of statistics," and
certainly not enough to constitute an "individualized inquiry. '230
Second, the Third Circuit noted that although these statistics indi-
cated that twelve percent 231 of CYS children had participated in some
sort of sexual abuse, the County's interpretation of "sexual abuse" in-
cluded activities that posed no risk of transmitting the HIV virus.232
The Third Circuit also found it significant that the Does had com-
municated to the County their preference for children under twelve
years old. 233 The court found that because most children under twelve
had not yet reached puberty, they were "extremely unlikely" 234 to
participate in behavior that could transmit HIV.235 Moreover, be-
cause of Adam's physical disabilities, the court found no evidence in-
dicating that Adam would initiate such contact. 236
The County argued that even if the probability of transmission was
small, the placement policy was justified because when dealing with a
disease with life-threatening consequences that has no cure, such as
HIV, even one lost life is too great. 237 The Third Circuit then reiter-
ated the different standards used among the circuits to determine if
224. Id. at 442.
225. Id.
226. Id.
227. Id. at 449-50.
228. County of Ctr.. 242 F.3d at 449 (citing Bragdon, 524 U.S. at 649).
229. Id. See supra note 196 and accompanying text.
230. County of Ctr., 242 F.3d at 449.
231. Id.
232. Id. See supra note 196 and accompanying text.
233. County of Ctr.. 242 F.3d at 449.
234. Id.
235. Id.
236. Id. at 450.
237. Id.
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HIV constituted a significant risk. 238 On the one hand, some appel-
late courts, such as the Fourth, Fifth and Sixth Circuits, have held that
when facing a disease as deadly as HIV "any amount of risk through a
'specific and theoretically sound means of transmission' constitutes a
significant risk, allowing invocation of the direct threat exception. '239
On the other hand, other appellate courts, such as the First and Ninth
Circuits, have required "a more exacting standard, requiring some ac-
tual risk of transmission including documented cases" to find a signifi-
cant risk of transmission. 240 The Third Circuit did not adopt either
standard, as a reasonable fact finder could find that there was no
probability of transmission from Adam to another child using the
more cautious rule of the Fourth, Fifth and Sixth Circuits. 241 The
Third Circuit noted that a reasonable fact finder could easily find that
the risk of Adam infecting another child because of forced sexual ac-
tivity was the "type of remote and speculative risk ... insufficient for a
finding of significant risk. '242
The County attempted to distinguish the placing of a child in a pri-
vate home with an HIV-positive individual from the more typical
ADA situation of an HIV-positive individual demanding access to
public life.243 The County argued that the private realm is harder to
monitor and involves more intimate contact. 244 Because of this dis-
tinction, the County argued the court should apply the more stringent
standard.245
The Third Circuit did not find this argument persuasive in justifying
the County's blanket prohibition. 246 The court rejected the notion
that monitoring and intimacy had any bearing on the significance of
risk analysis necessary under the direct threat defense.247 Thus, the
Third Circuit reversed the district court's grant of summary judgment
in favor of the County. 248
238. Id. at 450-51.
239. County of Ctr., 242 F.3d at 450 (quoting Onishea. 171 F.3d at 1297). See supra text ac-
companying notes 103-142.
240. County of Ctr., 242 F.3d at 450. See supra notes 147-183 and accompanying text.
241. County of Ctr.. 242 F.3d at 450.
242. Id.
243. Id. at 451.
244. Id.
245. Id.
246. Id.
247. County of Ctr.. 242 F.3d at 451.
248. Id.
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IV. ANALYSIS
This section will evaluate the Third Circuit's decision in Doe v.
County of Centre in terms of its application of the direct threat excep-
tion. Three main arguments will be asserted. First, the Third Circuit
correctly evaluated the "significance of risk" on objective evidence as
required under both the Rehabilitation Act and ADA. Second, be-
cause a blanket prohibition such as the one enacted by the County is
contrary to the goals of the ADA, the Third Circuit was correct in
reversing summary judgment granted by the district court in favor of
the defendants. Third, the Third Circuit missed the opportunity to
define how the "probability of transmission" factor is to be inter-
preted for the Third Circuit. A recommendation will also be sug-
gested as to the proper standard to be applied by the district court on
remand.
A. The "Significance of the Risk" Must Be Objectively Evaluated
The Third Circuit properly interpreted the Supreme Court's ruling
in Arline that the "significance of the risk" (as then interpreted under
section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act and since adapted into the
ADA) be evaluated on objective evidence.
Since the Does were denied the opportunity of becoming foster par-
ents (a public service) by the County based on their relation to Adam,
a person with a disability, they were eligible for relief under Title II of
the ADA.2 49 As discussed above, the direct threat exception has been
interpreted to apply to Title II even though it is not specifically stated
in the text. 25° Thus, the United States Supreme Court's interpretation
of the direct threat exception in Bragdon, although a Title III case,
applies to Title II cases as well.
In Bragdon, the Supreme Court stressed that the inquiry made into
the possible existence of a direct threat be based on objective evi-
dence.25' The Supreme Court also noted in Bragdon that under a di-
249. Id. at 447 (noting that "the protections of the ADA extend to 'qualified individuals' who
are discriminated against because of their relationship or association with individuals who have a
known disability"). See also 28 C.F.R. 35.130(g) (2001), cited in County of Ctr.. 242 F.3d at 447
(noting "[a] public entity shall not exclude or otherwise deny equal services, programs, or activi-
ties to an individual or entity because of the known disability of an individual with whom the
individual or entity is known to have a relationship or association").
250. See supra notes 89-92 and accompanying text. See also 28 C.F.R. § 35.130. app. A. p. 479.
quoted in County of Ctr.. 60 F. Supp. 2d at 427.
251. See Bragdon. 524 U.S. at 649 (explaining "Itlhe existence, or nonexistence of a significant
risk must be determined from the standpoint of the person who refuses the treatment or accom-
modation, and the risk assessment must be based on medical or other objective evidence" (citing
Arline. 480 U.S. at 288)). See also Aden. supra note 7. at 406: Leading Cases. supra note 173.
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rect threat analysis, "Arline and the ADA do not ask whether a risk
exists, but whether it is significant. 2 52 In County of Centre, the Third
Circuit properly followed this rule, as its decision was based on objec-
tive medical evidence presented at the district court hearing, and not
on "stereotypes or fear ... [or] on speculation about the risk or harm
to others. '2 53
The Third Circuit addressed whether the district court applied the
Arline factor test with the necessary objectivity mandated by Arline
and Bragdon. The Third Circuit found that the district court analyzed
the first three factors correctly based on the evidence. As to the first
factor, the nature of the risk, the district court found that "HIV...
has been proven to be transmitted through sexual intercourse ... in-
travenous drug use, and transfusion of blood and blood products. '254
As to the second factor, the duration of the risk, the Third Circuit did
not question the district court's finding that "AIDS is a terminal dis-
ease for which there is no cure. '255 The Third Circuit was also in
agreement with the district court's finding that "[t]he harm to third
parties is life-threatening ' 256 regarding the third Arline factor, the se-
verity of the risk.
The controversy in this case, as is common in HIV/AIDS discrimi-
nation cases, surrounded the fourth Arline factor, the probability of
transmission.25 7 The district court found "a high probability that
[HIV] will be transmitted [through sexual contact] to children placed
in foster care with the Does. ' 258 The Third Circuit, however, in ana-
lyzing the objective evidence presented at trial as mandated by Brag-
don,259 did not agree with this finding.
The evidence regarding the probability of transmission that was
presented to the district court is as follows. First, CYS officials
presented evidence that children in the County's foster care program
have a high tendency to sexually abuse other children. 260 However, as
noted previously, the County's definition of what constituted "sexual
abuse" included activities that posed virtually no risk of transmission
252. Bragdon, 524 at 649.
253. H.R. REP. No. 101-485, pt. 3, at 45 (1990). reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N 445, 468.
quoted in County of Ctr.. 242 F.3d at 448.
254. County of Ctr.. 242 F.3d at 449 (quoting County of Ctr., 60 F. Supp. 2d at 428).
255. Id.
256. Id.
257. See supra text accompanying notes 109, 120 136.
258. County of Ctr., 242 F.3d at 449 (quoting County of Ctr.. 60 F. Supp. 2d at 428).
259. See supra note 173.
260. County of Ctr.. 242 F.2d at 449. See supra note 196 and accompanying text.
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of HIV.26 t Second, CYS stated that they were unable to tell which
children were likely to participate in such abuse before placement.262
Third, the district court heard the testimony of two medical experts
concerning AIDS.263 These experts testified to the following facts:
First, normal sibling activities present virtually no risk of HIV trans-
mission.264 Second, with regard to transmission through sexual activ-
ity, the probability of HIV transmission is dependent on the kind of
sexual activity, what sexual roles the infected and uninfected persons
play, and the level of HIV virus detectable in the infected person. 265
One expert, Dr. Swenson, explained the following statistics regard-
ing the risk of HIV transmission in various sexual acts: The probability
of transmission to an infected partner who performs oral sex on an
uninfected partner is about 1 in 2500 for each occurrence. 266 The
probability of transmission "from a receptive HIV-positive partner to
an insertive HIV-negative partner in anal sex is about 1 in 1666."1267
The doctor also testified that the probability of transmission "from an
insertive HIV-positive partner to a receptive HIV-negative partner...
is much higher, about 1 in 120."268
It was on the basis of this evidence that the Third Circuit found that
there was a genuine issue of fact as to the probability of transmission,
thereby reversing summary judgment in favor of the defendants. 269
With regard to the statistics provided by CYS stating that twelve per-
cent of CYS foster children had a history of perpetrating some kind of
sexual abuse,270 the Third Circuit properly identified these statistics as
"a bland and generalized set of statistics, lacking in individual specific-
ity. '271 First, the Third Circuit noted that the defendant's definition of
sexual abuse was not limited to activities that could result in HIV
transmission. 272 This reliance on a "bland set of statistics" is contrary
to the Supreme Court's ruling in Bragdon that a finding of "significant
261. County of Ctr.. 242 F.3d at 449 (noting the county "broadly define[d] 'sexual abuse' to
include activities such as fondling and disrobing that carry no risk of transmission").
262. Id. at 444.
263. Id. at 442.
264. Id.
265. Id.
266. Id. at 443.
267. County of Ctr., 242 F.3d at 443.
268. Id.
269. Id. at 450.
270. Id. at 449.
271. Id.
272. CYS's definition of "assault" included activities such as fondling others and disrobing
others. These activities carry no risk of HIV transmission. Id. at 444-49.
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risk" be based on "medical or other objective evidence. 27 3 Clearly, if
a court finds that no triable issue of fact exists regarding the
probability of transmission of a virus, even one as deadly as HIV, the
evidence that the court bases its decision on must be indicative of
even a possibility of transmission. It makes no sense to weigh the
fourth Arline factor in favor of the County where the evidence
presented includes generalized activities that will not result in trans-
mission of the disease.
For this reason, the Third Circuit correctly relied on the objective
evidence presented at trial and found that reasonable minds may dif-
fer as to whether the defendants satisfied the fourth Arline factor, the
probability of transmission.
B. Blanket Prohibitions Are Contrary to the Goals of the ADA
The type of blanket rule the County enacted in attempt to prohibit
the Does from bringing another child into their home is contrary to
the goals of the ADA. First, one purpose of the ADA is to prevent
"purposeful unequal treatment ... based on characteristics that are
beyond the control of such individuals ... resulting from stereotypic
assumptions not truly indicative of the individual ability of such indi-
viduals to participate in, and contribute to, society. ' 274 A blanket pro-
hibition such as the one enacted by the County is, by definition, based
on such "stereotypic assumptions"2 75 and not on the specific facts of
any one case.
The legislative history of the ADA details many stories of prejudice
arising from irrational fears and misconceptions about HIV and
AIDS. One story involved a Kentucky woman who had been fired
from her job when it was revealed to her employer that her HIV-
positive son had moved into her home so she could care for him.27 6
Other examples involved "instances where people have been evicted
by landlords ... [struggled] for medical treatment [or] for acceptance
by family and friends. ' 2 77 After discussing the proper meaning to give
to the direct threat defense, a Judiciary Committee Report concluded:
273. Bragdon. 524 U.S. at 649.
274. 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(7) (1995).
275. Id.
276. H.R. REP. No. 101-485, pt. 2, at 30 (1990).
277. Americans with Disabilities Act of 1988: Hearing on H.R. 4498 Bef)re the House Sub-
comm. on Select Educ. of the Comm. on Educ. and Labor, 101st Cong. (1988). reprinted in 2
LEGISLATIVE HISToRY OF THE AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT OF 1990, COMM. ON Euuc.
ANI) LABOR. U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES. at 1236 (statement of Stephen Cohen. Co-Co-
ordinator for the Men's Project: The AIDS Memorial Quilt).
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A person with a disability must not be excluded, or found to be
unqualified, based on stereotypes or fear. Nor may a decision be
based on speculation about the risk of harm to others. Decisions
are not permitted to be based on generalizations about the disability
but rather must be based on the facts of an individual case.278
From these statements, as well as from stories of discrimination af-
fecting others with disabilities,279 it is clear that discrimination against
persons with disabilities often results from irrational fears, ignorance,
and misperceptions. 280 It is exactly these attitudes that the ADA and
Rehabilitation Act were enacted to prevent.
Nothing legitimizes such discriminating beliefs more effectively
than a blanket prohibition. A blanket rule prohibiting the placement
of foster children in a family where a member is diagnosed with a
contagious disease, although most likely enacted out of a good faith
attempt to protect foster children from contracting diseases, erodes
the core of the ADA (as well as the Rehabilitation Act). 21  Moreover,
278. H.R. REP. No. 101-45, pt. 3. at 485 (1990). cited in Ann Hubbard, Understanding and
Implementing the ADA's Direct Threat Defense, 95 Nw. L. REv. 1279, 1307 n.156 (2001).
279. See supra text accompanying notes 104. 114-115. 125. 134, 148. 160.
280. For an excellent summary of legislative history, see generally Hubbard, supra note 278.
See also id. at 1283. For an interesting perspective on the logistics of treating HIV-positive indi-
viduals differently on the basis of their status, see Benjamin R. v. Orkin Exterminating Co., 390
S.E.2d 814, 826 (W. Va. 1990) (Neely, C.J., concurring). Chief Judge Neely noted:
Yet the ostracism that even symptomatic HIV-positive subjects face is completely un-
necessary, and the miserv associated with such ostracism is needless suffering. At the
heart of this conclusion is the fact, discussed supra, that for every diagnosed HIV-posi-
tive subject there are (according to the mathematical models) at least sixteen undiag-
nosed cases. If then. we are already in day-to-day contact with HIV-positive subjects
whose condition is unknown to us. does it not make sense to continue day-to-day con-
tact with the HIV-positive subjects whom we know and to whom we already have ties
of friendship and affection? The answer to that question is obviously "yes," and it that
logic which instructs my understanding of what the law on this matter should be.
Id. (citations omitted).
281. See Hubbard. supra note 278, at 1314-15. Foster care has had its share of controversies.
See Org. of Foster Families for Equal. and Reform (OFFER). 431 U.S. at 833-34 (explaining that
"foster-care programs consequently stir strong controversy" in that they may often provide inad-
equate safeguards for biological parents and their Fourteenth Amendment liberty interest in
their children). As noted by Justice Brennan in his majority opinion, "[f]rom the standpoint of
natural parents . . . foster care has been condemned as a class-based intrusion into the family life
of the poor." Id. at 833. Thus, a program such as the one run by the County certainly has
incentive to bolster the role of the biological parents whose children are placed in foster care.
The District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania found that in enacting the infectious
diseases policy. "CYS considered its policy under the Adoption and Safe Families Act, 42 U.S.C.
§ 671. whereby the foster child's health and safety shall be the paramount concern in administer-
ing and conducting its foster home program." County of Ctr., 60 F. Supp. 2d at 422. The Adop-
tion and Safe Families Act provides federal financial assistance to state foster care and adoption
programs. 42 U.S.C. § 671 (1995). The Act provides, among other things:
In order for a State to be eligible for payments under this part, it shall have a plan
approved bv the Secretary which ... (10) provides for the establishment or designation
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a blanket prohibition by definition does not effectuate its rule "based
on the facts of an individual case. '2 82
The County policy was enacted based on the kind of misrepresenta-
tions and irrational fears against which the ADA and Rehabilitation
Act were designed to protect. A blanket prohibition makes clear that
under almost no circumstances may a family with a member who has a
contagious disease care for a foster child. Significantly, this prohibi-
tion was enacted only after Adam's disease was discovered. Even
though numerous state policies forbade segregating or otherwise dis-
criminating against children with HIV or AIDS, the County felt it nec-
essary to enact the prohibition at issue. 283 This is because it was faced
directly with the situation not only of a child with a "serious infectious
disease" but also of a child with AIDS. Although basing the enact-
ment of the policy on documented cases of sexual assault instigated by
foster children on other children in the placement homes, 284 the provi-
sion contains only one exception to its prohibition. This exception
may be invoked if foster parents in the Does' position voluntarily re-
lease information to the would-be adoptive child's natural parents re-
garding the health status of the family member diagnosed with the
infectious disease. 28 5  Although beyond the scope of this Note, it
should be mentioned that many states have enacted legislation to pro-
of a state authority or authorities which shall be responsible for establishing and main-
taining standards for foster family homes and child care institutions which are reasona-
bly in accord with recommended standards of national organizations concerned with
standards for such institutions or homes, including standards related to admission poli-
cies, safety, sanitation, and protection of civil rights, and provides that the standards so
established shall be applied by the State to any foster family home or child care institu-
tion receiving funds ....
42 U.S.C. § 671(a)(10) (1995).
282. H.R. REP. No. 101-485, pt. 3, at 45 (1990), cited in Hubbard, supra note 278, at 1307
n.156.
283. See County of Ctr., 242 F.3d at 443 (discussing numerous policies enacted by many public
agencies of Pennsylvania, such as the Department of Public Welfare, stating "HIV positive chil-
dren should not be segregated in day care facilities, foster homes, group homes, residential
placements, or institutions based on their HIV status alone," and the Department of Services for
Children, Youth and their Families stating "[e]xcept where the presence or risk of [HIV infection
from a foster child] presents specialized care needs, the presence or risk of [HIV] should not be
the mitigating factor in the placement decisions"). The Third Circuit concluded that "[tihese
policies generally state that family services agencies should neither apply blanket prohibitions
against placing HIV-positive foster children with HIV-negative children, nor segregate HIV-
positive foster children from HIV-negative children without analyzing the particular circum-
stances of each case." Id. at 443.
284. See supra note 231 and accompanying text.
285. County of Ctr., 242 F.3d at 435.
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tect HIV-positive individuals from exactly this kind of mandatory dis-
closure concerning their HIV status.28 6
The prohibition does not take into consideration the "facts of an
individual case" 287 in another sense. As noted by the Third Circuit,
the Does stated that their preference was for foster children under the
age of twelve.288 The court then found that children under twelve are
children the defendants may be able to identify as unlikely to engage
in the type of activity that may lead to the transmission of HIV.28 9
Also, if Adam's other disabilities were better addressed, the district
court should have realized that the likelihood of Adam being physi-
cally able to sexually assault another child was remote at best. The
expert opinion in this case laid out different scenarios of HIV trans-
mission. The highest risk of transmission (1 in 120) would arise if
Adam were to perform anal sex on another child.2 90 Yet Adam's vari-
ous disabilities make it most unlikely that such activity would be possi-
ble.2 91 The actual risk that Adam will infect another with HIV lies in
the circumstances where another child was to perform insertive anal
sex on Adam. Dr. Swenson placed this risk at about 1 in 1666.292
However, as noted even by the district court, this risk is even less
where the HIV-positive individual has very low viral loads, as does
286. The Illinois AIDS Confidentiality Act is one example of such an enactment. See 410 ILL.
CONIP. STAT. 305/9 (1997). The Act provides, with a few enumerated exceptions that. "[n]o
person may disclose or be compelled to disclose the identity of any person upon whom a[n HIV]
test is performed. or the results of such a [n HIV] test in a manner which permits identification
of the subject of the test." Id. The Act also provides (with an enumerated exception) that "[n]o
person to whom the result of a test have been disclosed may disclose the test results to another
person." 410 ILL. COMP. STAT. 305/10 (1997). See also N.Y. PuB. HEALTH LAW § 2782 (McKin-
ney 2002) (prohibiting the disclosure of an individual's HIV-positive status except to enumer-
ated persons or agencies). For more information about how confidentiality may be kept while
assuring public health data may be collected, see Lawrence 0. Gostin & James G. Hodge, Jr.,
The "Names Debate": The Case for National HIV Reporting in the United States, 61 ALB. L. Rev.
679 (1998).
287. See supra note 282.
288. Count o'f oCr., 242 F.3d at 450.
289. Id. The Third Circuit noted:
Foster children of tender age-i.e., infants and children who have not reached pu-
berty-are extremely unlikely to commit forcible sexual intercourse leading to the
transmission of HIV. Moreover, as noted there is no evidence indicating that Adam is
at all likely to commit such an assault, and much evidence suggesting that this is most
unlikely. Thus, we believe that the probability of HIV transmission from Adam to a
tender-aged child placed in the Does' home appears to be insignificant.
Id. at 449-50.
290. See supra note 268 and accompanying text.
291. See County of Cir.. 60 F. Supp. 2d. at 423 (noting that Adam suffers from learning disabil-
ities which have "left him unable to care for himself." he "verbalizes very little," he "shows
symptoms of autism and mental retardation." and required the assistance of his parents with all
of his hygienic care).
292. See supra note 267 and accompanying text.
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Adam.293 If the County looked to the facts specific to this situation,
including Adam's physical limitations, it should be clear that there re-
ally is not a significant risk of transmission.
The County also defended its policy on the basis of its inability to
tell which children in need of placement were likely to be sexually
aggressive toward other children. 294 This is because children in the
County's care often need to be placed with a family as quickly as pos-
sible. 295 A blanket prohibition such as the one enacted should not be
necessary to cure this inability of the County. Rather, as pointed out
by the Third Circuit, child placement with the Does could be done in
situations where emergency placement was not necessary. 296 The
County should have also concluded that because of Adam's other dis-
abilities, it is extremely unlikely that he would be the instigator of any
type of sexual assault that may lead to HIV transmission. Yet the
County, which enacted this prohibition specifically out of the facts of
this case, found it necessary to enact a blanket prohibition.
Second, the blanket prohibition enacted by the County does little
more than give effect to private fears and prejudices aimed toward
individuals with HIV or AIDS. The Supreme Court has already noted
in Palmore v. Sidoti297 that such private prejudices should not be given
legitimate effect. 298 In Sidoti, the Supreme Court considered whether
private racial biases may be considered in determining if a home is
suitable for a child.2 99 The Court ruled that these private biases con-
cerned with the "social stigmatization" 30 0 a child may feel from grow-
ing up in a multi-racial home may not be considered, holding although
"[p]rivate biases may be outside of reach of the law... the law cannot,
directly or indirectly, give them effect. ' 30 1 Although Sidoti is an equal
293. County of Ctr., 80 F. Supp. 2d at 443. However, the Sixth Circuit would still consider a 1
in 1666 chance significant, as a 1 in 42.000 to a I in 420,000 chance of transmission was still found
to be a significant risk of transmission in the eyes of the majority. See Estate of Mauro, 137 F.3d
at 405. This author does not intend to imply that a I in 1666 chance of transmitting the HIV
virus should not be taken seriously.
294. County of Ctr., 242 F.3d at 450.
295. Id. at 444 (explaining that the County enacted the policy due to "the emergency nature of
foster child placement").
296. Id. at 452. The Supreme Court has noted that "the distinctive features of foster care are.
first, that it is care in a family, it is noninstitutional substitute care, and second, that it for a
planned period-either temporary or extended." Org. of Foster Families for Equal. and Reform
(OFFER), 431 U.S. at 824 (emphasis added).
297. 466 U.S. 429 (1982).
298. Id. at 433. See supra note 74 and accompanying text.
299. Sidoti, 466 U.S. at 433.
300. Id. at 431.
301. Id. at 433.
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protection case concerning race, 302 County of Centre may be analo-
gized to it on the basis that in the familiar context, private fears,
prejudices, and stigmatizations may arise when household members
are perceived to be different from one another. However, it is when
these private beliefs come into play that the protection of the law is
most crucial.
C. Some Actual Risk of Transmission Should Be Required for a
Finding of a Direct Threat
In reversing summary judgment granted in favor of the defendant
County, the Third Circuit correctly ruled that Adam did not necessa-
rily pose a direct threat to any child placed with the Does. As dis-
cussed above, the Third Circuit gave effect to the ADA by not
allowing prejudices or fears determine the risks an HIV-positive boy
poses to other children.303 However, in remanding the case back to
the District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania, the Third
Circuit fell short in providing guidance on the proper interpretation of
a direct threat/significant risk, especially with regard to the controver-
sial fourth Arline factor, the risk of transmission.
Although noting that some courts have followed a cautious rule al-
lowing any theoretical risk of transmission to constitute a significant
risk of transmission,30 4 while others have demanded that the fourth
factor could not be satisfied without providing evidence of known
cases of transmission, 30 5 the court chose not to decide which (if either)
of these standards was to be the rule for the Third Circuit.306 In not
deciding on the proper standard to be used, the Third Circuit left the
door open for the district court to find that Adam constitutes a direct
threat on a standard that does not fully effectuate the goals of the
ADA. This argument is based on two observations. First, it appears,
based on the cases discussed above, 307 that when the "more cautious
rule" of the Fourth, Fifth, Sixth and Eleventh Circuits is applied, un-
due weight is given to the third Arline factor, the severity of the risk.
Second, this "cautious rule" really fails to give proper weight to the
fourth Arline factor, the probability of transmission. Arline's test can
be molded to let the direct threat "exception" to the ADA swallow
302. See Loving v. Virginia. 388 U.S. 1, 10 (1967) (noting "the clear and central purpose of the
Fourteenth Amendment was to eliminate all official state sources of invidious racial discrimina-
tion in the [s]tates").
303. See supra notes 290-296 and accompanying text.
304. County of Ctr.. 242 F.3d at 450. See supra notes 103-142 and accompanying text.
305. Countv of Ctr.- 242 F.3d at 450. See supra notes 143-183 and accompanying text.
306. County of Cr.. 242 F.3d at 450.
307. See supra notes 103-142 and accompanying text.
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the rule, thus permitting discrimination against those in society who
need protection most.
1. Undue Weight Given to the Severity of the Risk
"The decision to exclude cannot be based on merely 'an elevated
risk of injury.' "308 As noted by the Third Circuit in County of Centre,
some courts, when faced with the "life-threatening consequences of
HIV ' 30 9 will find any possibility (as opposed to probability as required
by Arline) of transmission to constitute a significant risk.310 However,
courts that have applied the Arline test when considering the signifi-
cance of risk involved with HIV have put undue weight on the third
factor, the severity of the risk.31' Science, the media, and public
health facilities across the world have made great efforts to inform the
general public that HIV causes AIDS, which is usually fatal.312 There
is no doubt that HIV is a disease that still has catastrophic results,
even when taking into consideration new discoveries and treat-
ments. 313 However, Arline's test, as written into the Rehabilitation
Act and judically applied to the ADA, does not require only a show-
ing of a "severe risk" to invoke the direct threat exception. Rather, all
four factors must be considered. Neither the purposes of the Rehabil-
itation Act nor those of the ADA are served by allowing one factor to
overwhelm the entire test.
308. Hubbard. supra note 278. at 1349 (quoting H.R. REP. No. 101-485. pt. 3. at 46 (1990).
(9th Cir. 1985)) (quoting Mantolete v. Bolger. 767 F.2d 1416. 1422).
309. Count' of Ctr.. 242 F.3d at 450.
310. Id.
311. See Onishea. 171 F.3d at 1306 (Barkett, J., dissenting) (noting that "the fatal conse-
quences of a contagious disease, in the majority's view, suffice to render a transmission risk
significant even if the probabilities of transmission are so low as to approach zero. so long as
transmission could theoretically occur, letting one factor overwhelm the entire Arline analysis")
Hubbard, supra note 278, at 1321. For an example of an analysis allowing the severity of the risk
factor overwhelm the Arline factor test. see Bragdon, 524 U.S. at 664. Chief Justice Rehnquist
explained:
Given the "severity of the risk" involved here. i.e. near certain death, and the fact that
no public health authority had outlined a protocol for eliminating this risk in the con-
text of routine dental treatment, it seems likely that petitioner can establish that it was
objectively reasonable for him to conclude that treating respondent in his office posed a
"direct threat" to his safety.
Id. (Rehnquist. C.J., dissenting) (emphasis in original).
312. Although the vast majority of the public has accepted this scientific model that HIV is a
virus that leads to the disease called AIDS. there are challenges to this predominate view. See
Neville Hodgkinson. Molecular Miscarriage. MOrHERING MAG., Sept.-Oct. 2001. at 59, 61-64
(arguing that there is no concrete proof that HIV exists as a virus or that it is the cause of what is
commonly called AIDS). Thabo Mbeki, the current president of South Africa, is one world
leader who has subscribed to this idea. Policy and Practice Economic Trends: South Africa-
AIDS Inaction Concerns Investors, FIN. TIMES. Sept. 1. 2001 (on file with DePaul Law Review).
313. See supra notes 27-33 and accompanying text.
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By allowing persons with HIV to be discriminated against based on
the nature of his or her disease and its consequences, the direct threat
exception may be invoked in any situation where an HIV-positive per-
son faces discrimination. This will essentially write HIV-positive indi-
viduals out of both the ADA and Rehabilitation Act. Individuals who
are HIV-positive will not have the benefit of the "balance" that the
Arline factor test is intended to reach between protecting society from
the spread of diseases and protecting the rights of the disabled. 314
Clearly, HIV and the stigmatization that accompanies the disease
show that society is not yet ready to accept individuals infected with
HIV into mainstream society. It is of no surprise that HIV-positive
individuals are in great need of protection through the ADA (and Re-
habilitation Act). Thus, courts should not allow the direct threat ex-
ception to swallow protections of the law that are desperately needed
by HIV-positive individuals.
2. Probability of Transmission Insufficiently Weighed
As noted in Bragdon315 and discussed in the legislative history of
the ADA, 31 6 a person eligible for protection under the ADA need not
prove that "he or she poses no risk. '31 7 Rather, the key to both the
ADA and Rehabilitation Act is that the risk not be significant. 318 One
factor that must be considered, as mandated by Arline, is the proba-
bility of transmission, not merely the possibility of transmission. 319
314. See supra notes 67-69 and accompanying text. See Hubbard, supra note 278, at 319-20
(citations omitted).
315. See supra notes 173-174 and accompanying text.
316. See supra note 308 and accompanying text.
317. H.R. REP. No. 101-485, pt. 3, at 46 (1990), reprinted in I LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF 3-HE
AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT OF 1990, COMM. ON EDUC. AND LABOR, U.S. HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES, at 466. It noted:
As stated in Chalk v. U.S. District Court, "[l]ittle in science can be proved with com-
plete certainty, and section 504 does not require such a test. As authoritatively con-
strued by the Supreme Court. section 504 allows the exclusion of an employee only if
there is 'a significant risk ... to others.'"
Id. (emphasis in original).
318. See supra notes 173-174 and accompanying text.
319. See Hubbard, supra note 278, at 1321-22. Courts have used some colorful language in
aiding their decision about what amount of risk of transmission is enough to constitute a signifi-
cant risk. See Benjamin R.. 390 S.E.2d at 820 (Neely, C.J.. concurring) (explaining that "the
tension" surrounding the amount of risk that is enough to constitute a significant risk in the
ordinary person's eyes can be explained by "lifeboat ethics"). Chief Judge Neely explained:
If there are twenty people in a lifeboat, and the likelihood is fifty percent that an addi-
tional person will capsize the boat, acting compassionately is logically foreclosed. On
the other hand, if the likelihood of capsize with an additional person is but one in a
thousand, than almost everyone would welcome an additional stranded swimmer into
the lifeboat.
Id. See also Onishea. 171 F.3d at 1297:
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Just because HIV transmission in any given situation is possible cer-
tainly does not mean it is probable.320
In County of Centre, the evidence presented by the defendant
County regarding statistics that may show children in foster care are
sexually aggressive may very well prove that it is possible that Adam
could transmit HIV to another child. This does not mean that the
likelihood of transmission is probable. It seems as though the only
way to clearly establish whether the likelihood of transmission is prob-
able is to require a showing that there is an actual probability of trans-
mission. The only way to show this probability is to require
documented cases. When courts invoke the direct threat exception
based on "specific and theoretically sound means of transmission,
321
what is really being considered is the possibility of transmission and
not its probability.
It may be argued that requiring actual recorded cases showing an
actual risk of transmission to satisfy the probability of HIV transmis-
sion is "a 'somebody has to die first' standard. ' 322 This is not the case.
This argument was a main contention between the majority and dis-
senting opinions of Onishea.323 As addressed above, in Onishea, the
Eleventh Circuit adopted the "more cautious" direct threat applica-
tion by allowing a "showing of specific and theoretically sound means
of possible transmission" to constitute a significant risk. 324 The major-
ity defended its position by referring to the requirement that docu-
mented cases be required for a showing of a direct threat as a
"somebody has to die first standard. '32 5 The Eleventh Circuit de-
fended its policy on the basis that the "more cautious rule" first pro-
tects people with disabilities from "unfounded fears and prejudices 326
[W]e are far more likely to consider walking a tightrope to pose a significant risk if the
rope is fifty feet high than if it is one foot off the ground. This is so even if the odds of
losing our balance are the same however far we have to fall.
320. See Martinez. 861 F.2d at 1506 (holding the "remote theoretical possibility" that a men-
tally retarded seven year-old would transmit the AIDS virus to others through tears, saliva, and
urine does not arise to the level of significance that is required under section 504 of the Rehabili-
tation Act). See also Estate of Mauro, 137 F.3d at 403, which noted:
The risk can only be considered when it poses a significant risk, i.e. high probability, of
substantial harm . . . [t]hus, our analysis in the instant case must not consider the possi-
bility of HIV transmission, but rather focus on the probability of transmission weighed
with the other three factors of the Arline test.
Id. (emphasis in original).
321. County of Cr.. 242 F.3d at 450.
322. Onishea, 171 F.3d at 1299. See supra notes 134-142 and accompanying text.
323. Onishea, 171 F.3d at 1299. See supra notes 134-142 and accompanying text.
324. Onishea. 171 F.3d at 1297.
325. Id. at 1299.
326. Id. at 1298 (emphasis in original).
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of others and second protects entities which must follow the ADA
from "well-founded worries that deaths can result. '327  However,
Judge Barkett's dissenting opinion took issue with the language of the
majority opinion. 328
Judge Barkett's opinion, joined by Chief Judge Hatchett, advocated
for the adoption of the latter interpretation of the direct threat excep-
tion. 329 In doing so, the opinion criticized the majority's ruling that
the test requiring actual documented cases was a "somebody has to
die first standard. ' 330 Rather, the dissent argued, this test required
"evidence that particular conduct will transmit the disease and a rea-
sonable likelihood that the conduct will actually take place in the par-
ticular program at issue."'331 This does not mean that before the risk
can be considered significant, someone must die. Rather, the "noble
goals" 332 of the ADA are achieved by "prohibiting discrimination
against individuals with disabilities while protecting others from sig-
nificant health and safety risks" 333 and not by "absurd[ly] conclud[ing]
that Congress has decreed even a few painful deaths in service of the
Act's noble goals. '334
Further support for the requirement that actual cases of transmis-
sion be documented before a finding of a direct threat can be found in
Bragdon. Although the Bragdon majority specifically left open the
question of whether Abbott posed a significant risk to the health or
safety of her dentist, Dr. Bragdon, 335 in dicta the court indicated that
documented cases may be required in order to find a significant risk of
transmission. The Supreme Court briefly considered evidence
presented by Bragdon that indicated a possibility that seven dental
workers had been infected by HIV in the course of their employ-
ment.336 The Court concluded that even if the seven dental workers
had contacted HIV in the course of their employment, these seven
327. Id. at 1298-99 (emphasis in original).
328. Id. at 1307. See infra note 329 and accompanying text.
329. Onishea. 171 F.3d at 1298-99.
330. Id.
331. Id. at 1307 (Barkett. J.. dissenting).
332. Id. at 1299.
333. Bragdon. 524 U.S. at 649.
334. Onishea, 171 F.3d at 1299.
335. Bragdon, 524 U.S. at 654. The Court instead remanded the issue to the Court of Appeals
for the First Circuit. This decision was based on the fact that the Supreme Court had not been
briefed on the direct threat issue and heard no arguments concerning the matter. Id.
336. See supra text accompanying notes 180-181. However the CDC was not able to conclude
whether their infection was actually obtained during the course of their employment as the
health care workers did not show up for testing at the necessary post-exposure time. Bragdon,
524 U.S. at 654.
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cases would not "[sitanding alone . . . meet the objective, scientific
basis for finding a significant risk to [Bragdon]." 337 This seems to indi-
cate that in at least one situation, seven documented cases may not be
enough for a showing of a significant risk.338 If this is so, it seems to
follow that a theoretical risk of transmission substantiated by no docu-
mented cases would not satisfy the requirements of the ADA.
It is interesting to note the changing interpretation of significant
risk under the ADA and Rehabilitation Act as applied to cases of
HIV/AIDS over time. Early cases of HIV discrimination such as Mar-
tinez v. School Board339 and Chalk340 represented the view that a the-
oretical risk of transmission was not enough. When the ADA was still
in its infancy, one commentator noted "[t]he ADA and Rehabilitation
Act define a significant risk as one that is more than 'theoretical,' 're-
mote,' 'potential,' 'speculative,' or 'merely an elevated risk.' To be
significant, a risk must be 'appreciable' or 'substantial' and it must
create a significant risk of harm. ' 341 However, some later cases have
shown that at least a theoretical risk of transmission is enough to con-
stitute a direct threat.342 It seems that the more is known about HIV/
AIDS and its transmission, the more we want to limit the public
sphere from those who suffer from the disease. This is in spite of our
progressed knowledge of the disease, including how the disease is
transmitted. Today, unlike the days when Martinez and Chalk were
decided, we know that HIV will not be transmitted through saliva or
through casual contact. 343 When these older HIV discrimination cases
were decided, however, courts were not gifted with this scientific
knowledge. However, courts were willing to give more weight to anti-
discrimination standards when less was known than the present day,
when our knowledge (as well as our fears) are (or at least should be)
more rationally based. It seems as though the opposite result should
be expected. It seems that courts should have expressed more con-
cern and have had more fears about the risks that individuals pose
when the risk of transmission was less known. Now that more is
known about the actual risk of transmission, it should be expected
that courts would look to the actual probability of transmission as
337. Id.
338. See Hubbard. supra note 278. at 1320-21.
339. 861 F.2d 1502 (11th Cir. 1988). See supra note 141.
340. 840 F.2d 701 (9th Cir. 1988). See supra notes 147-156 and accompanying text.
341. Sidney D. Watson. Eliminating Fear Through Comparative Risk, Docs, AIDS, and the
Anti-Discrimination Ideal. 40 BUFF. L. REv. 739, 786 (1992) (citations omitted).
342. See supra notes 103-142 and accompanying text.
343. See supra note 21 and accompanying text.
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proved by actual cases in order to decide whether or not a specific risk
is significant.
D. A Suggestion for the District Court for the Middle District of
Pennsylvania on Remand
Although the Third Circuit declined to adhere to either interpreta-
tion of what constitutes a significant risk of transmission, the district
court should fully effectuate the goals of the ADA on remand. In
order to do this, the district court should opt for the position of the
First and Ninth Circuits and require a showing of actual, documented
cases in order to show a significant risk of transmission. This is the
only way to protect Adam and his family from the stigmatizing effects
of his disease and allow his case to be individually judged. Thus, in
order for the County to succeed in proving that Adam poses a direct
threat to any other child that may be placed with the Does, the
County must be able to point to a specific documented case of a child
in foster care contracting HIV from being placed in a family with an
HIV-positive child. Only then may the County claim to give proper
respect to the goals of the ADA.
V. IMPACT
Doe v. County of Centre is a small accomplishment for disabled
Americans, especially those infected with HIV. County of Centre sig-
nifies a fresh application of the direct threat exception and the ADA
in the private realm of family, opposed to the traditional application
in the public employment context, most significantly the health care
setting, and may breathe new life into the recently limited powers of
the ADA.
Since the ADA was enacted in the early 1.990s, its protections have
slowly been etched away.3 4 4 In a recent Supreme Court case, Toyota
Motor Manufacturing v. Williams,345 a Title III case, the Court signifi-
cantly reduced the number of people who would be eligible for cover-
age under the ADA. In its unanimous decision, the Court ruled that
344. See Jan Crawford Greenburg, 7p Court Limits Disabilities Law, CHI. TRIB., Jan. 23,
2002. § 1, at I (discussing a recent United States Supreme Court ADA case, Toyota Motor Mfg.
v. Williams. 122 S. Ct. 681 (2002). which upheld a more stringent standard "to assess whether a
person qualifies as disabled under the Americans with Disabilities Act." the threshold question
of the ADA). Greenburg commented that many disability rights advocates saw the decision as
"the latest in a string of Supreme Court rulings that have narrowed the reach of the law."
Greenburg, supra. One expert commented that the Williams decision was one in a series of
"cases [that] are a distortion of what Congress intended to do when it passed the ADA." Id.
345. 122 S. Ct. 681 (2002).
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in order to show a "substantial limitation" as required by the ADA,346
a plaintiff must show that his or her impairment substantially limits
"activities that are of central importance to most people's daily
lives ' 347 and not just activities which are essential to one's job, as the
Sixth Circuit had previously ruled.348 Thus, protections under the
ADA seem to be dwindling. 349 The Third Circuit should therefore
reinforce the congressional intent that "a clear and comprehensive na-
tional mandate for the elimination of discrimination against individu-
als with disabilities" be developed to protect those with disabilities.
350
If the Third Circuit were to adopt the First and Ninth Circuit rule
requiring that some actual risk of transmission be shown by docu-
mented cases, the resulting split among the circuits could give the Su-
preme Court the opportunity to decide the issue it left open in
Bragdon. Hopefully, the Supreme Court would make the correct de-
cision and reinforce protections to which Congress has already de-
cided the disabled are entitled.
The Third Circuit's failure to adopt the rule of the First and Ninth
Circuits will also likely lead to further judicial confusion regarding the
proper interpretation of what may constitute a significant risk of
transmission. 351 Courts should require a showing of actual docu-
mented cases of transmission in a similar context. This keeps the
power of deciding how diseases may be transmitted with those who
have the knowledge and resources to decide such matters-health
care agencies such as the CDC. Such decisions about actual risks of
transmission cannot be expected to be made by our courts and cannot
be left to discretionary interpretation. Evidence needs to be provided
indicating that transmission in any given situation is actually probable
in that it has been documented to have happened before.
346. See 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(A) (1995) (defining "disability" as "a physical or mental impair-
ment that substantially limits one or more of the major life activities of such individual").
347. Williams, 122 S. Ct. at 691.
348. Williams v. Toyota Motor Mfg., 224 F.3d 840, 843 (6th Cir. 2000).
349. See also Bd. of Trs. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356 (2001) (holding that individuals were not
constitutionally permitted to bring Title I cases against state employers because Congress, when
enacting the ADA. did not properly abrogate state Eleventh Amendment immunity).
350. 42 U.S.C. § 12101(b)(1) (1995).
351. See Hubbard, supra note 278. at 1321-22. Hubbard explained the existence of a:
disturbing tendency among lower federal courts to conclude that any risk, even a re-
mote risk, satisfies the direct threat standard where the alleged harm is severe . . ..
Because there is as yet no cure for AIDS, lower courts have readily accepted the direct
threat defense when there is any risk of transmission, without stopping to ask whether
that risk is appreciable or significant.
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Many will likely continue to believe that this is a "somebody has to
die first standard. ' 352 To alleviate these fears, this author suggests
that when dealing with a disease such as HIV, which has no cure and
will likely result in death, a surrogate may be used.353 Under a surro-
gate theory, a disease that has modes of transmission similar to those
of HIV, could be substituted for HIV when considering the
probability of transmission factor. The likely surrogate for HIV infec-
tion is the Hepatitis B virus (HBV). These two viruses, HIV and
HBV, share many similarities. 354 Both viruses are transmitted by
blood.355 Modes of transmitting HBV are similar to those of HIV:
unprotected sex with an infected individual, sharing needles, and
transmission from mother to child.356 The virus has also been passed
from patient to doctor by accidental needle sticks.357 Based on these
similarities, when using the approach of finding a significant risk of
transmission through documented cases, HBV may be used as a surro-
gate for HIV. Thus, in a situation like Adam's, if the County were
able to prove by actual documented cases that children in foster care
in a situation similar to Adam's have transmitted HBV to other chil-
dren, the County's burden of proving the fourth Arline factor could be
met.
There are, however, numerous problems with this approach. First,
HBV is transmitted much more readily than HIV.35 8 Because of this,
one would expect to find cases of HBV transmission in situations
where the risk of HIV transmission, although present, is not signifi-
cant. Second, HBV may be transmitted in ways where no HIV trans-
mission has been shown. For example, Hepatitis B has been shown to
352. See supra notes 322-334 and accompanying text.
353. This approach is based on Sidney D. Watson's "Comparative Risk" approach. See Wat-
son, supra note 341, at 794-806. Watson's approach requires that in terms of the health care
setting, an HIV-positive health care worker may not be dismissed as a significant risk to prospec-
tive patients without first comparing the risks posed by an HIV-positive health care worker to
the risks presented by other health care workers. Id. One factor to look at is whether other
health care workers are infected with Hepatitis B. Id. Watson concludes: "If the risk posed by
an HIV infected health care worker is equal to or less than other risks normally tolerated, then
the worker does not pose a significant risk." Id. at 795.
354. 1d. at 799. See Centers for Disease Control, Viral Hepatitis B Fact Sheet, at http://
www.cdc.gov/ncidod/diseases/hepatitis/b/fact.htm (last reviewed Dec. 12. 2001) (on file with
DePaul Law Review) [hereinafter Viral Hepatitis B].
355. Viral Hepatitis B. supra note 354.
356. Id.
357. Watson. supra note 341, at 799.
358. Id. See also Recommendations for Preventing Transmission of Human Immunodeficiency
Virus and Hepatitis B Virus to Patients During Exposure-Prone Invasive Procedures, MORBIDITY
& MORTALITY WKLY.. July 12. 1991. available at http://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/preview/mmwrhtml/
00014845.htm (last reviewed May 2. 2001) (on file with DePaul Law Review).
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be transmitted through "household contacts. ' 359 Such contacts in-
clude sharing toothbrushes.3 60 Thus, not only is HBV more readily
transmitted than HIV, it may be done in more casual ways. Certainly
in the foster care setting there is a risk that children will use the same
toothbrush or other personal items. This risk likely rises above the
"type of remote and speculative risk that is insufficient for a finding of
significant risk. '361
Perhaps the biggest flaw with using HBV as a surrogate for HIV is
that a surrogate test may in fact be nothing more than the cautious
standard relied on by the Fourth, Fifth, Sixth and Eleventh Circuits in
disguise. Using a substitute for HIV, the disability in question in cases
like County of Centre, almost by definition constitutes only a "theoret-
ically sound risk of transmission. ' 362 Using a surrogate virus for HIV
also will likely raise issues about the individualized inquiry require-
ment of Arline. In order to tell if there is a risk of transmission of
HIV it will likely be necessary to look only at HIV. Thus, a surrogate
model will likely fail.
The manner in which courts determine the fourth Arline factor, the
probability of transmission, may also affect the interpretation of other
legislation focused on the AIDS epidemic. One such statute is the
Illinois Criminal Transmission of HIV statute.363 When dealing with a
contagious disease such as HIV/AIDS, a disease with no cure that is
widely misunderstood and carries with it a great stigmatizing effect, it
is easy to allow fears of contracting the disease to overwhelm one's
senses, but this is precisely why the ADA was enacted. Courts need
guidance in deciding exactly what constitutes a significant risk of
transmission. Persons facing discrimination based on their HIV-posi-
tive status need clear, consistent protections. By allowing the direct
threat exception to overwhelm the fundamental rule of the ADA, that
359. Viral Hepatitis B. supra note 354.
360. Id.
361. County of Ctr.. 242 F.3d at 450.
362. See supra notes 140-141.
363. 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/12-16.2 (2002). The statute states:
Criminal Transmission of HIV (a) A person commits criminal transmission of HIV
when he or she. knowing that he or she is infected with HIV: (1) engages in intimate
contact with another: (2) transfers, donates, or provides his or her blood, tissue, semen.
organs. or other potentially infectious body fluids for transfusion, transplantation. in-
semination, or other administration to another, or (3) dispenses. delivers, exchanges,
sells, or in any other way transfers to another any nonsterile intravenous or intramuscu-
lar drug paraphernalia.
Id. It later defines "intimate contact with another" as "the exposure of the body of one person
to a bodily fluid of another person in a manner that could result in the transmission of HIV.- Id.
(emphasis added).
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"no qualified individual with a disability shall, by reason of such disa-
bility, be excluded from participation in or be denied the benefits of
the services, programs, or activities of a public entity, or be subjected
to discrimination by any such entity, ' '36 4 persons with HIV will essen-
tially be written out of the Act.
VI. CONCLUSION
Based on the above analysis, the Third Circuit was correct in revers-
ing the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of the de-
fendant County. Enacting a blanket prohibition against placing foster
children in a home where a family member has HIV/AIDS is a viola-
tion of the ADA and section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act. However,
the court should have done more and joined the First and Ninth Cir-
cuits in holding that in order to constitute a direct threat/significant
risk to others, there must be some actual risk of transmitting a disease
to others. This risk must be shown by documented cases of transmis-
sion in a similar context. This is the only way to give effect to the
ADA's goal of "protecting disabled individuals from discrimination
based on prejudice, stereotypes, or unfounded fear."365
Jody Marcucci*
364. 42 U.S.C. § 12132 (1995).
365. 28 C.F.R. § 35.130(g). app., at 479, cited in County of Ctr.. 242 F.3d at 447.
* The author wishes to thank her family and friends for their encouragement and support.
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